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6   The Editors
The Editorial Board is pleased to present the first issue of the eighteenth 
volume of the Penn History Review, the Ivy League’s oldest undergraduate 
history journal. The Review continues to publish outstanding undergraduate 
papers based on original primary research. The Board is proud to feature 
scholarship that maintains the University of Pennsylvania’s tradition of 
insightful and diverse historiography. These papers span not only centuries 
and geographic regions, but also disciplines in the study of history. The 
authors published in this issue approach their historical inquiries with a 
particular respect to the larger theme of transformation. In addition to 
providing four exemplary student essays, this issue of the Review features 
a special introductory essay by Professor of Modern European History, Dr. 
Jonathan Steinberg.
 We are honored to publish an incisive essay by the University of 
Pennsylvania’s very own Professor Jonathan Steinberg that traces the 
intellectual and psychological development of Otto von Bismarck. The piece 
begins with the question: “how did a giant of a man, a rural aristocrat with 
no military credentials, a record of failure and irresponsibility in normal jobs, 
and a dissolute life-style, became the great Bismarck of history?”  Dr. Steinberg 
begins to answer this and other questions about the man he calls “the most 
interesting character of the nineteenth century.” The essay represents an 
excellent introduction to Professor Steinberg’s new book, Bismarck: A Life 
(Oxford University Press, February 2011).
 Our second piece, written by University of Pennsylvania undergraduate 
Emily Mullin, explores the transformational 1838 production of King Lear 
by William Macready as a unique moment of unity between scholars and 
thespians. This 1838 version of Lear set the foundation for centuries of further 
Lear exploration – both on and offstage – by incorporating contemporary 
critiques of the play and revealing Macready’s particular interpretation of the 
play.  This piece offers an exciting examination of the way scholarship interacts 
with art in order to reshape understandings of even the most canonical works.
 Kwang-Yew See, a University of Pennsylvania undergraduate, authored 
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the third essay in the Fall 2010 edition: The Downfall of General Giraud: 
A Study in Wartime Politics. See’s piece investigates the diplomatic intrigue 
surrounding the American, and to a lesser extent the British decision to support 
General Jean Giraud in his duel for control of the French Resistance with 
General Charles de Gaulle. The essay surveys the evolving British approach 
to the Giraud despite his unwavering American support, juxtaposed upon the 
personal struggle between Giraud and de Gaulle.
 Our fourth piece, Transformation of Jewish Identity in the Soviet Union 
by University of Pennsylvania undergraduate Anna Vinogradov, probes the 
evolution of Jewish identity in the USSR in the face of murderous campaigns 
by both Stalin’s regime and German invaders.  The essay discusses the ways 
Soviet nationality policy influenced and coexisted with historic identity 
patterns of Soviet Jews. In particular, Vinogradov traces the process by which 
official Soviet atheism led to the Soviets to classify a historically religious 
group as a national one, forcing Soviet Jews to reconcile their religious past 
with an imposed nationalist identity.
 The fifth and final article, by Brady Lonegran, begins by exploring 
the variable and sometimes arbitrary application of the term “bandit” by 
Roman authors to agents acting outside the traditional aegis of the state. 
Lonegran uses Sallust’s The Jurgurthine War to engage with problems of the 
definitional ambiguity: although Jugurtha’s fighting style matched that of 
most contemporaneous bandits, his status as ruler of a client-kingdom made 
him officially a rebel, while the official declarations of war by the Senate were 
more appropriate to a formal external foe.
 The collection and publication of these papers represents the collaborative 
effort of many individuals. The Review would like to thank the many members 
of the history faculty who encouraged their students to submit essays for 
publication. The Editorial Board would like to especially thank Dr. Kathy 
Peiss, the undergraduate chair of the History Department, for her continued 
support, and Dr. Jonathan Steinberg, for his essay submission. Finally, we 
thank the University of Pennsylvania and the History Department for their 
generous financial support of the Review, efforts to foster undergraduate 
research, and commitment to cultivating future historians.
 
Gideon Spitzer       Emily Kern
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I first lectured on Otto von Bismarck (1815-1898) in Lent Term 1964 at 
Cambridge University as a very junior research fellow. From the beginning 
something about his achievements puzzled me. How had he done it? My new 
biography Bismarck. A Life (Oxford University Press, February 2011)1  asks 
this question.  Of course, previous biographers have asked and answered it 
too but not as the central issue. They asked what did Bismarck accomplish, 
with what consequences for German and European history. I ask how a giant 
of a man, a rural aristocrat with no military credentials, a  record of failure 
and irresponsibility in normal jobs, and a dissolute life-style, became the great 
Bismarck of history. A few contemporaries saw that Bismarck had an urge to 
dominate his fellow human beings more powerful than any other impulse 
in his nature. His university roommate, the American John Lothrop Motley 
(1814-1877), saw it in the eighteen year-old Bismarck  and in 1839 published 
a novel about him long before he became the Bismarck of history, Morton’s 
Hope or the Memoirs of a Provincial in two volumes (New York: Harper and 
Brothers, 1839). I wonder how many readers of this journal know anybody 
in the Penn student body about whom they would want to write a novel. I 
suspect the answer would be none. If any of you want to read the original 
novel, there is a first edition in the Rare Book Room at the Van Pelt Library.
Here is what the thinly disguised Otto von Rabenmarck told Motley when 
they were freshmen at the University of Göttingen as recounted in Motley’s 
book :
‘I intend to lead my companions here, as I intend to lead them in after-
life. You see I am a very rational sort of person now and you would hardly 
take me for the crazy mountebank you met in the street half-an hour ago. 
But then I see that this is the way to obtain superiority. I determined at 
once on arriving at the university, that the way to obtain mastery over my 
competitors, who were all, extravagant, savage, eccentric, was to be ten 
times as extravagant and savage as any one else . . .’ His age was, at the time 
of which I am writing, exactly eighteen and a half. ‘[p. 41]
Jonathan Steinberg 
Bismarck: A Life  
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The Prussian officer, Albrecht von Roon (1803-1879), probably saw the 
same ambition when he employed the undergraduate Bismarck to help him 
with military surveying. This will to dominate lay behind a charm of speech 
and manner, a delicious, irreverent sense of humor, a warmth and hospitality 
that captivated even his opponents. They say he ‘bewitched’, ‘enchanted’, 
‘charmed’,  ‘delighted’ and ‘fascinated’ them. Disraeli, no mean charmer 
himself, said “he talks as Montaigne writes’. [p. 373]
 As a child he defended himself against his ambitious, cold mother by lies. 
He lied all his life and contemporaries saw that too. On other occasions, he 
told the truth about his plans so frankly that listeners could not believe their 
ears. He could be kind and cruel, emotional and cold, sensitive and heartless, 
honest and devious. His personality had authority and contemporaries 
used ‘demonic’, ‘diabolical’ or ‘despotic’ to describe it. He had  stupendous 
intellectual powers and a huge capacity to work behind a façade of laziness. 
Bismarck was the most interesting character of the nineteenth century. 
Theodor Fontane, the novelist and direct contemporary, said ‘When Bismarck 
sneezes or says prosit!, it’s more interesting than the speeches of six progressives.’ 
[p. 5] Here are a few vignettes from the book. When a particularly grumpy 
ambassador came to see him, Bismarck watched with relief as he left. Near 
the gate Bismarck’s  dog began to bark, Bismarck shouted from the window, 
‘Goltz! Don’t bite my dog’ [p. 119]. Christoph von Tiedemann went to dine 
at the Bismarck’s in 1875 and after dinner he and Heinrich von Sybel, the 
historian, were offered the use of the toilet facilities in Bismarck’s bedroom: 
two huge chamber pots. Von Sybel looked at them in awe. ‘Everything about 
the man is great; even his s---.’ [p. 10] 
For all his brilliance, he could not be called a charismatic orator. On July 
17, 1878 the Schwäbische Merkur carried a description of his parliamentary 
oratory:
‘How astonished are those who hear him for the first time. Instead of a 
powerful, sonorous voice, instead of the expected pathos, instead of a fiery 
tirade glowing with classical eloquence, the speech flows easily and softly 
in conversational tones across his lips, hesitates for a while and winds 
its way until he finds the right word or phrase, until precisely the right 
expression emerges. One almost feels at the beginning that the speaker 
suffers from embarrassment. His upper body moves from side to side, he 
pulls his handkerchief from his back pocket, wipes his brow, puts it back 
in the pocket and pulls it out again.’ [p. 1]
Afterwards Bismarck flew into a rage at the humble stenographers who took 
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down the debates in the Reichstag and described his dark suspicions a month 
later on 4 October, 1878, to one his aides, Mortitz Busch, who recorded it:
‘The shorthand stenographers turned against me in connection with my 
last speech. As long as I was popular that was not the case. They garbled 
what I said so there was no sense in it. When murmurs were heard from 
the Left or Centre, they omitted the word ‘Left’ and when there was 
applause, they forgot to mention it. The whole bureau acts in the same 
way. But I have complained to the President. It was that which made me 
ill. It was like the illness produced by over-smoking, a stuffiness in the 
head, giddiness, a disposition to vomit etc.’ [pp 3-4]
Consider that evidence. Could a sane man seriously believe that a conspiracy 
of stenographers had developed in the duller corridors of the Reichstag to 
undermine the greatest statesman of the nineteenth century? And the illness 
as a result? Hypochondria hardly does justice to the complaints.
Bismarck achieved his feats because his powerful personality disarmed and 
commanded his supporters and his opponents alike for nearly four decades, 
but not even the most sovereign of selves can operate successfully without 
help. In Bismarck’s case four factors created the ‘Bismarck of history’: first, 
the change in the international balance of power, over which he had no 
control; second the institutional structure of the Kingdom of Prussia after the 
Revolution of 1848, over which he also had no control; third, the appointment 
of another ‘genius’ General Helmut von Moltke (1800-1891), to be Chief of 
the Prussian General Staff in 1857 and  his transformation of the Prussian 
army over which Bismarck as a civilian could by definition have no control, 
and finally, the support of a small group of influential patrons who saw in 
Bismarck  - and rightly – that his ‘genius’ (discerning contemporaries used 
that word) would be the key to the preservation of the Prussian semi-absolute, 
military monarchy in the new political world created by the revolutions of 
1848. In this one area, he had not only control but mastery.
International affairs played into his hands. In 1848 he saw the reality that 
the French Revolution of 1848 offered no threat, as he wrote to his brother 
Bernhard: ‘The motives of 1792, the guillotine and the republican fanaticism, 
which might take the place of money, are not present.’ [p. 88] He saw in 
the 1850s that the Empire of Napoleon III would do his job for him. As he 
wrote to his horrified patron, General Leopold von Gerlach, who regarded 
Napoleon III, as the embodiment of ‘red revolution,’
‘The present form of government in France is not arbitrary, a thing that 
Louis Napoleon can correct or alter. It was something that he found as a 
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Portrait of Otto von Bismarck wearing a spiked Prussian 
helmet, 1880. (Deutsches Bundesarchiv) 
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given and it is probably the only method by which France can be ruled 
for a long time to come. For everything else the basis is missing either 
in national character or has been shattered and lost. If Henry V were to 
come to the throne he would be unable, if at all, to rule differently. Louis 
Napoleon did not create the revolutionary conditions; he did not rebel 
against an established order, but instead fished power out of the whirlpool 
of anarchy as nobody’s property. If he were now to lay it down, he would 
greatly embarrass Europe, which would more or less unanimously beg 
him to take it up again.’ [p. 132]
Napoleon III, imprisoned in the myth of his great uncle, Napoleon I, had to 
liberate Italy. He provoked an unnecessary war with Austria 1859 and helped 
to weaken the most important element in the balance of power, the Habsburg 
monarchy. The incompetence of the Austrian monarch and his advisors did 
the rest. They owed Tsar Nicholas I a great debt for his intervention in 1848 
which saved the Monarchy and crushed the Hungarian Revolution of 1849. 
When the Tsar asked for Austrian help against the Western Powers during 
the Crimean War in 1854, Franz Joseph refused it. Austria caught between 
Napoleonic France and a disgruntled Russia had no ally against Prussia. The 
new Tsar Alexander II came to the throne in 1855 convinced that Russia’s 
defeat in the Crimean war showed that serfdom and backwardness threatened 
the very existence of the Tsarist state. The great ‘reform era’ took Russia out of 
active diplomacy for just long enough for Bismarck to deal with a weakened, 
isolated and indecisive Habsburg Monarchy. He did not create these realities 
but he exploited them with consummate mastery.
The Prussian state which Bismarck served depended on its army and the 
compact between the Crown and its nobility. When Frederick William, the 
Great Elector, decided in 1653 to have ‘his own forces’ rather than to rely 
on mercenaries, he began a process which turned Prussia into a military 
monarchy, ‘not a state with an army, but an army with a state in which it 
happens to be stationed.’ Frederick the Great, another disastrous genius in 
German history, fashioned that army into the essential element in the social 
structure, as he explained in his Testament of 1752 :
‘The Prussian nobility has sacrificed its life and goods for the service of the 
state; its loyalty and merit have earned it the protection of all its rulers...it 
is one goal of the policy of this state to preserve the nobility. [p. 15]
In Moltke’s order of battle for 1870, the famous names of Prussian history 
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show up again in the distribution of commands: several von Kleists (3), von 
der Goltzes (2), Neidhart von Gneisenau, von Below (2), von der Osten, von 
Sennft-Pilsach, von Manteuffel, von Bülow (2), von Wedell, von Brandenburg 
(2), a colonel von Bismarck, von Wartensleben, von Alvensleben, etc. and a 
sprinkling of royal princes in staff and command posts. [p. 291]
Bismarck inherited the Prussian Constitution of 1850, a hybrid 
compromise between modern representative government with civil rights 
and the remains of the absolutism of Frederick the Great. The new parliament 
had no power over  military nor civil appointments. It created a sort of 
cabinet but until the Cabinet Order of 1852 no very clear description of the 
office of Prime Minister called in Prussia, Minister-President. Parliament had 
the power of the purse and soon represented the growing commercial and 
industrial middle class. A House of Lords represented the ruling aristocracy. 
The King’s powers rested uneasily among the branches of government. Here 
too Bismarck had not created the conflict that must arise between Crown and 
Parliament over the army.
Bismarck’s King, William I, (1797-1888) followed the model of Frederick 
the Great. He worked hard, avoided display  and saw himself first and 
foremost as a soldier. In one respect, he differed from all his predecessors. 
He had the self-confidence to entrust his civilian affairs to Bismarck and 
in 1866 to surrender command of his army to the other ‘genius’ of the age, 
Helmuth von Moltke. For the four years from 1866 to 1870, Prussia had a 
unified military command structure under the greatest strategist and military 
planner of the modern era. Moltke took over a Prussian General Staff in 1857 
which had developed a range of sophisticated war games and manoeuvres. 
He developed a plan for the use of railroad transport to get large armies 
to the right places in time and a strategy for their deployment –Getrennt 
marschieren, gemeinsam schlagen [march separately, fight together]. Slender, 
cultivated, modest and calm, Moltke became the idol of his troops. One 
of his staff officers wrote of him, ‘We all feel happy in his company, and 
absolutely love and worship him.’[p. 137]
The other  man who transformed the army was less well known then 
and now, Lieutenant General Albrecht von Roon, (1803-1879). Roon made 
Bismarck’s career possible, and he knew it. In a letter from 1864 to his best 
friend, Clement Theodor Perthes (1809-1867), he put it this way:
‘Bismarck is an extraordinary man, whom I can certainly help, whom I 
can support and here and there correct, but never replace. Yes, he would 
not be in the place he now has without me, that is an historical fact, but 
14    Jonathan Steinberg
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Left to right, Otto von Bismarck, Albrecht von Roon, and Helmuth 
Karl von Moltke, 1860. 
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even with all that he is himself .’ [pp. 6 and 185]
Without Roon Bismarck could have had no career in the Prussian monarchy. 
Bismarck tried to get out of compulsory military service (documents omitted 
from the official publication of papers between the two world wars show this) 
and had no military credentials beyond a year as a reserve officer in a modest 
regiment. In Frederick the Great’s Prussia, the landed gentry and aristocracy 
all ‘served’ and ‘served’ meant only service in the army. They went first to the 
Kadettenanstalt, the military schools, and then to their regiment. Bismarck 
went to a bourgeois gymnasium and to university. He was, as Baron von der 
Osten sneered in Fontane’s novel Irrungen, Wirrungen, ‘nothing but a pen 
pusher’. 
Without Roon, no Bismarck of history.  When his friend Perthes accused 
him of appointing a man ‘who calculates so coldly, who prepares so cunningly, 
who has no scruples about methods’, Roon replied that Bismarck could 
‘assess the nature and weight of the effective forces, which one cannot know 
precisely, that is the work of the historic genius’ [p. 6, 185]. Roon provided 
what Bismarck lacked: immediate access to the King. As a general, Roon 
could request an audience of the King as his commanding officer at any time. 
He served Bismarck loyally to his death in 1879;  as one of Moltke’s staff 
complained, Roon was a kind of famulus, the medieval word for a sorcerer’s 
apprentice. 
Bismarck, the sorcerer himself,  used his magical gifts to manipulate and 
control a rigid, stubborn, reactionary old gentleman, William I, King of 
Prussia If William I had had the decency to die at the biblical ‘three score 
and ten’ in 1867, Bismarck’s creation, the North German Federation, might 
have eventually absorbed the South German kingdoms but not through a 
devastating war. William did not die at 70, nor at 80, nor at 90 but in 1888 
at 91 and that longevity of the old King gave Bismarck 26 years in office. 
During those twenty-six years Bismarck forced the King again and again by 
temper tantrums, hysteria, tears, and threats to do things that every fibre in his 
spare frame rejected. For twenty-six years Bismarck ruled by the magic that he 
exerted over the old man. Bismarck’s career rested on personal relations—in 
particular, those with the King and the Minister of War.  Because Bismarck had 
a power-base of one person he depended on the old man’s health (excellent), 
his willingness to be bossed by him (limitless) and the tensions of the king’s 
marriage (weak husband – strong wife) to rule Germany and change history. 
He thus re-enacted the horrors of his childhood with his cold, ambitious, 
frightening mother and his feeble, old, ineffectual father still exercising power 
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over him. Indeed, had the king not been weak, Bismarck could not have 
used the remnants of royal absolutism to make his will felt through the entire 
political system. He paid a terrible price in hypochondria, hysteria, illness, 
sleeplessness, rage and over-eating. He destroyed much of his social life, the 
happiness of his children, the friendships of his youth and his peace of mind, 
but he dominated his society so utterly that contemporaries called him a 
dictator. He destroyed more than just his health. He had a disastrous effect 
on Germany. Political opponents became ‘enemies’ and enemies had to be 
crushed. In a speech to the Lower House in 1863, he explained his view 
of political conflict, ‘Constitutional life is a series of compromises. If these 
are frustrated, conflicts arise. Conflicts are questions of power, and whoever 
has power to hand, can go his own way.’ [p. 472] He destroyed German 
liberalism and tried to stamp out the Catholic Center Party. He outlawed 
Social Democracy and wanted to deprive socialists and trade unionists of 
their votes.  He helped the worst elements of the old ruling class to survive, 
so they could in 1933 give the office that the ‘Iron Chancellor’ had  created 
to a ‘Bohemian corporal’ who destroyed the rest of the Germany Bismarck 
had made.
  
1. All citations are drawn from Bismarck. A Life and the page numbers correspond to those in 
the book. All  translations are mine.
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On the evening of January 25, 1838, at the Covent Garden Theatre in 
London, the curtain opened on the first performance of King Lear to restore 
Shakespeare’s original story to the stage. For the first time in over one hundred 
and fifty years, under the influence of the tragedian and manager William 
Charles Macready, the play ended tragically, included Shakespeare’s Fool, 
and refrained from interjecting a romance between Cordelia and Edgar. This 
performance represents an essential moment in the study of Shakespearean 
criticism and understanding: until 1838 it was believed that Lear could 
not be represented onstage,1 that “classical” performances in general were 
unprofitable,2 and that the story of Lear, in particular, was distasteful to the 
public.3 But, while it may appear that Macready’s performance broke with 
all previous tradition, it was the culmination of previous scholarship and 
theatrical efforts that led to its production. 
Examining the 1838 production of Lear and situating it as precisely as 
possible in its theatrical, critical, and artistic context, reveals the way in 
which this context played a role in the artistic choices Macready made. By 
taking into account contemporary nineteenth century scholarship on King 
Lear and learning from previous productions in its interpretation of the play, 
Macready’s performance unified two flanks that had been previously divided 
without apparent hope of reconciliation. Thus, the 1838 production of King 
Lear represents a vital moment in Shakespearean scholarship—the union, 
however brief, of the scholars and the theatre. 
Perhaps the most brazen theatrical approach came in 1681 when Nahum 
Tate decided to rewrite the play almost entirely.  Tate’s “revision” of Lear 
was by no means an isolated incident of theatrical vandalism. During the 
Restoration, many of Shakespeare’s plays were rewritten: the plots and 
language were simplified and condensed under the influence of neoclassical 
rules. Tate’s revision of Lear governed the production history of Lear for the 
next century—it was astoundingly popular, effectively replacing Shakespeare’s 
text until Macready brought it back in 1838. The changes Tate made became 
points of debate for actors and critics, subsequently crystallizing the debate 
over Lear’s interpretation as the century progressed. Thus, the first step 
The Restoration of King Lear to the British Stage 
Emily Mullin 
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towards defining Shakespeare’s Lear onstage became defying the previous 
interpretation that had dominated it for so long. 
Tate based his rendition on the principles of neoclassicism, specifically the 
Unities, as well as the predominating Augustan ideals of tragedy.4  In terms 
of neoclassical rules, the Unity of Action concerned Tate the most. The lack 
of cohesion between the Lear and Gloucester stories spurred him to invent a 
romance between Edgar and Cordelia—of which he was immensely proud, 
lauding it specifically in his introduction to the play.5 Bringing Edgar and 
Cordelia together unified the two plots, creating a Unity of Action, what he 
termed “Regularity,”6  not present in Shakespeare. The romance served Tate’s 
other purposes as well—to create a logical tragedy in which the motivations 
of the characters became logical and even admirable.7  
In order to explain Lear’s temperament and later madness, Tate 
foreshadowed it. Just before Lear’s entrance, Kent, now Lear’s “physician,” 
exclaims, “I grieve to see him with such wild starts of passion hourly seiz’d,/
As it render Majesty beneath it self.”8  To which Gloucester replies, “Alas! ‘tis 
the Infirmity of his Age,/Yet has his Temper ever been unfixt,/Chol’rick and 
suddain…”9 Thus, Lear became incarnated not just as an old man, but as 
one whose temper defined his character throughout his life and degraded the 
throne.
Tate’s final, and most substantial, change to the play was the ending. He 
dethroned the tragedy by ending the piece as a romance, in which Lear and 
Cordelia survive and Edgar marries Cordelia. Tate’s discomfort with the ending 
can hardly be attributed to his ignorance of literature. Even Shakespearean 
scholar A.C. Bradley, in his chef-d’oeuvre Shakespearean Tragedy, could barely 
reconcile himself to Lear’s ending.10 However, Tate’s immediate motivation for 
the changes lay in his interpretation. Tate saw Lear as a play about redemption 
and filial tenderness, and for that reason, saw no necessity in a tragic ending.11 
In this story, the recognition scene, not the deaths of Lear and Cordelia, 
became the most important scene of the play. Thus, a tragedy would have 
been counterproductive to the moral he was trying to convey. 
Making the play moral certainly fit within the context of the eighteenth 
century. Joseph Donohue noted in The Cambridge History of Theatre, by 
the late 1600s, “a society and a theatrical audience were developing which 
increasingly looked to plays to set examples of refined, morally upright 
conduct.”12  Critics and audiences met Tate’s alteration of the ending with 
approbation, and in many ways this moral ending stood in the way of Lear’s 
restoration to the stage simply because it was so satisfying. As late as 1774, 
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after Garrick had begun to restore Shakespeare’s text, William Richardson 
wrote, “[t]he morals of Shakespeare’s plays are, in general, extremely natural 
and just; yet, why must innocence unnecessarily suffer? Why must the hoary, 
the venerable Lear be brought with sorrow to the grave? Why must Cordelia 
perish by an untimely fate?”13  Thus, we can see to what extent almost a 
century later the audience and critics still approved of Tate’s interpretation. 
Though the ending of Lear would inhibit its restoration during the 
eighteenth century, by 1742, David Garrick began putting Shakespeare 
back onstage. Garrick’s interpretation of Lear and his newfound respect for 
Shakespearean verse contributed to the growing understanding of the play. 
Garrick’s performance as Lear set the tone for all performances to follow; even 
Macready considered Garrick’s Lear when he began to construct his own. 
Thus, in order to understand Lear in 1838, we should first examine Lear in 
the mid-eighteenth century. 
Lear was Garrick’s “chef d’oeuvre:”14 Garrick as Lear was “a little, old, 
white haired man, with spindle-shanks, a tottering gait, and great shoes upon 
his little feet.”15 His personal take on the character demonstrates a remarkably 
unique understanding of the famous king: 
“Lear is certainly a weak man, it is part of his character—violent, old, 
and weakly fond of his daughters… his weakness proceeds from his age 
(four score & upwards) and such an old man full of affection, generosity, 
passion and what not meeting with what he thought an ungrateful return 
from his best belov’d Cordelia.”16
Lear’s weakness, particularly in madness, was incarnated in Garrick’s 
physicality of him: “[h]e had no sudden starts, no violent gesticulation; his 
movements were slow and feeble; misery was depicted in his countenance.”17 
Garrick’s model for Lear demonstrates that his conception of the character 
was based on pathos and senescence; Lear’s madness comes out of extreme 
grief, and is manifested by a slowing down of the mental processes, not frenzy. 
At the beginning of his career, Garrick played Tate’s Lear, though he later 
worked to restore more and more of Shakespeare’s original text. He never 
reached the point, however, where he cut the love story between Edgar and 
Cordelia, included the tragic ending, or added the Fool. His restorations 
remained purely textual and organizational, changing little of Tate’s plot. 
George Stone attributed Garrick’s conservatism on these points to economic 
concerns: “[e]xamination of Garrick’s entire connection with the versions 
of Shakespeare and Tate… demonstrates the dilemma of an eighteenth-
century mind caught between an ideal liking for Shakespeare and a canny 
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William Macready as King Lear with Helen Faucit as 
Cordelia.
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understanding of box-office appeal.”14  
Indeed, Garrick’s choice to retain the romance between Edgar and 
Cordelia proved to be the wisest choice he could have made at the time. 
On February 20, 1768, George Colman, inspired by Garrick’s restorations of 
Shakespeare, staged an alteration of King Lear omitting the romance, though 
it retained the happy ending and still excluded the Fool. The Theatrical Review 
declared, “[w]e think his having restored the original…is a circumstance not 
greatly in favour of humanity or delicacy of feeling, since it is now, rather 
too shocking to be bourne; and the rejecting of the Episode of the loves of 
Edgar and Cordelia, so happily conceived by Tate, has, beyond all doubt, 
greatly weakened the Piece.”15  The critical outrage sunk Coleman’s piece 
into obscurity. Years later, Macready wrote, “I believe the elder Colman put 
out an alteration, but I question whether it was acted; certainly it did not 
hold its place on the stage.”16  Thus, despite the progress made during the 
eighteenth century in restoring Shakespeare’s text, it left much to be desired. 
Tate’s version still held sway. However, off-stage, Shakespearean criticism also 
progressed. 
After Garrick’s retirement in 1776, the critics took center stage in Lear’s 
development. Because of King George III’s impending madness, from 1780 
until 1810, Lear was rarely performed, and banned outright from 1810 
until the king’s death in 1820. In some ways, this hiatus in stage production 
allowed Shakespeare’s Lear to gain ground against Tate’s version. But, between 
1780 and the early nineteenth century, other factors changed as well that 
may have predisposed the Regency era towards the darker, Shakespearean 
King Lear. Victor Hugo declared, “The nineteenth century has for its august 
mother the French Revolution… [it] has for family itself, and itself alone. 
It is characteristic of its revolutionary nature to dispense with ancestors.”17 
In the revolutionary spirit, then, theatre critics began to dispense with 
the regulations that had governed the theatre throughout the eighteenth 
century. The sentiment against Tate only grew stronger, even to the point 
of critiquing Garrick himself for playing Tate’s version. Charles Lamb, the 
renowned Shakespearean scholar declared, “I am almost disposed to deny 
to Garrick the merit of being an admirer of Shakespeare. A true lover of his 
excellences he certainly was not—for any true lover of them have admitted 
into his matchless scenes such ribald trash as Tate… [has] foisted into the 
acting [play] of Shakespeare?” 18 
Psychology became a predominating interest of critics, particularly 
the episodes of Lear’s madness. The 1780s also saw the rise of interest in 
22  Emily Mullin
Macready’s Triumph 
the character of the Fool, though within the context of examining Lear’s 
character.19  In fact, the passion of the critics for the play’s psychological and 
philosophical depth led Charles Lamb to declare in 1812,
“The Lear of Shakespeare cannot be acted. The contemptible machinery 
by which they mimic the storm which he goes out in, is not more 
inadequate to represent the horrors of the real elements, than any actor 
can be to represent Lear… Lear is essentially impossible to be represented 
on a stage.”20 
His opinion that Lear did not belong onstage would remain the popular critical 
opinion, and would be, perhaps, verified, by the subsequent productions of 
the play—all of which failed to meet the theatrical and intellectual demands.
When King Lear officially returned to the stage after King George III’s 
death, Edmund Kean, the passionate, romantic star of the early nineteenth 
century stage, resolved to step into Garrick’s shoes as the man to take steps 
towards restoring the original story of King Lear. Though the first revival of 
the play, in 1820, was Tate’s version, on February 10, 1823, Kean decided 
to play Lear with the restored tragic ending. Kean had evidently declared his 
intentions that the audience should “see him over the dead body of Cordelia” 
even before 1820; the theatre critic Hazlitt went so far as to suggest that 
Kean’s poor Lear in 1820 was acted “out of spite.”21  Kean’s restoration of the 
ending was apparently a personal goal, though he restored little else in the 
play. The love-story between Edgar and Cordelia remained, and the Fool was 
still absent. The reviewer from the John Bull observed, 
“We were a good deal disappointed on visiting the theatre to find that 
no steps had been taken to knock away Tate’s plastering and restore the 
original beautiful structure other than concerns the last act, and that all 
the mawkish love-scenes of the bungler were still suffered to encumber the 
splendid work of the bard.”22   
However, Kean’s restoration of the ending was a tremendous step forward 
for the stage. As Odell notes, “in face of the accumulated opinion of the 
eighteenth century that the death of Lear and Cordelia on the stage ‘would 
never do…’ Kean proved that it would.” 23  Kean’s performance, regardless of 
its failings, moved the story of King Lear towards a full restoration.
In addition, Kean took steps towards theatrical realism in his 
interpretation: he was determined to have a realistic storm inside the 
theatre. Kean envisioned a tempest driven by mechanical effects he had 
seen demonstrated at a mechanical exhibition. The effect was elaborate: 
“The scenic trees were composed to distinct boughs which undulated in the 
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wind, each leaf was a separate pendant rustling with the expressive sound of 
nature itself.”24 Unfortunately, the storm was so accurate that according to 
the review in the Times, Kean “could scarcely be heard amid the confusion.”25 
Macready probably read the cautionary line in the Times, “[Kean] should have 
recollected that it is the bending of Lear’s mind under his wrongs that is the 
object of interest, and not that of a forest beneath the hurricane.”26  
Unfortunately for Kean, despite his attempts at progress, the production 
itself was unsuccessful, not only because of the production values but because 
of Kean’s melodramatic performance as Lear. The failure to represent the 
tragic king only seemed to verify Charles Lamb’s definitive statement that 
Lear could not be acted. Critics continued to assert that the only way to 
experience King Lear was to read it. Keats’ poem “On sitting Down to Read 
King Lear Once Again” demonstrated to what extent Lear had become a 
solitary, literary experience during the early nineteenth century. Lamb, too, 
asserted that only through reading Lear will we experience the play: “On the 
stage we see nothing but corporal infirmities and weakness, the impotence of 
rage; while we read it, we see not Lear, but we are Lear.” 27   
Given this split between Lear’s life as a literary work and theatrical piece, 
Macready was the ideal actor to unify the two worlds. He represented the only 
person capable of doing justice to Shakespeare’s Lear onstage, “[a] man who 
passed his life at odds with the profession he led.” 28  Unlike Garrick, Macready 
cared more for the theatre as an entity than for his own popularity. Because 
the cultural climate of London had changed, a restoration of Shakespeare’s 
King Lear was daring, but not necessarily unthinkable. The danger was not so 
much in doing it, but in doing it right.
Macready spent his entire life working to elevate the theatre. He explained, 
“Among my motives the primary one was the wish to elevate my art and to 
establish an asylum for it.” 29 The lack of financial motives gave Macready 
a freedom that Garrick never had: he could challenge the status quo of the 
theatre. In doing so, he hoped “to establish a theatre in regard to decorum 
and taste, worthy of our country, and have in it the plays of our divine 
Shakespeare, fitly illustrated…” 30 Macready elevated “divine” Shakespeare 
beyond the pedestal Garrick had placed him on. In a sense, his desire to refine 
Shakespeare made him more of a Shakespearean critic than a man of the 
theatre. He detested the rewrites and any attempt to “improve” Shakespeare, 
particularly when the changes were made by managers in order to make a 
profit. In 1836, Macready went so far as to physically attack his manager, 
Alfred Bunn, for forcing him to play a truncated version of Richard III that 
24  Emily Mullin
Macready’s Triumph 
ended at Act III. After this episode, which banned him from the Drury 
Lane Theatre, Macready found that he would be forever dissatisfied with his 
profession unless he controlled his own productions.
As an actor, Macready applied his intellectual appreciation of Shakespeare. 
He studied his parts intensely and spent hours simply reading the plays he 
performed. George Vanderhoff, a fellow actor, described him as merging the 
two styles of the actors that preceded him, Kemble, a studious actor who 
specialized in elocution, and the passionate Kean: “[h]e tried to blend the 
classic art of the one with the impulsive intensity of the other; and he overlaid 
both with an outer-plating of his own, highly artificial and elaborately 
formal.”31 Macready’s peers often noted that his diligence allowed him to 
change acting styles depending on the part he played.32   In his youth, his 
fellow actors ridiculed him for “acting” during rehearsals that were generally 
little more than walk-throughs.33  In fact, the first chance he had to play Lear, 
in 1820 (a feeble attempt to challenge Kean’s first revival), he turned down 
because he believed he would not be able to study Lear adequately in just a 
few weeks. Instead, he appeared as Edmund.34   
After turning down the opportunity in 1820, Macready first appeared 
as Lear in London during the 1834 production at Drury Lane. Trewin 
described the performance as “a fairly reasonable version, for though the Fool 
was still un-restored, he had managed to lop most of Tate’s foolishness, and 
Shakespeare’s last act was played as it had been a decade before in the Kean-
and-Elliston revival.” 35 Thus, Macready furnished the second step towards 
a complete restoration of Shakespeare’s Lear: the love story had finally been 
cut, and only the Fool remained to be restored—though that omission alone 
left a considerable amount of text un-spoken onstage. Given that that Fool 
could be considered the most risky element of Shakespeare’s Lear to restore 
(Macready would believe so as well in 1838), Mr. Bunn would doubtless 
not approve of his appearance in the piece. Certainly, Macready’s own 
lack of influence over productions, specifically his inability to curb cuts to 
Shakespeare’s work, eventually contributed to his decision to become the 
manager of Covent Garden.
On September 30, 1837, Macready opened his first performance as 
manager of the Covent Garden Theatre in London. In a public address to 
the house he announced that the “decline of drama, as a branch of English 
literature [is] a matter of public notoriety; that [he] hoped to advanced it 
as a branch of national literature and art.”36  Not far away, Alfred Bunn, 
now Macready’s rival, retorted publicly that classical plays have always shown 
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heavy losses and contemporary plays heavy gains, so “the public had what it 
wanted.”37  Throughout the season, the two theatres competed publicly for 
audiences; the common rivalry between theatres was spurred by the ideological 
and personal differences between the two managers. But, by January 1837, 
it appeared Bunn was right— Macready announced that Covent Garden 
had lost £ 3,000. In a daring, and perhaps reckless, decision to recuperate 
losses and jump-start the season in the New Year, Macready announced that 
he would restore King Lear to the stage, “as Shakespeare wrote it, with the 
character of the Fool, and without the silly manipulation…that had so long 
disgraced the stage.”38  Thus, King Lear became a last hope for Macready’s 
plan to elevate the theatre and restore Shakespeare to its rightful place on the 
English stage. 
The artistic choices that went into the 1838 production of King Lear 
deserve attention as a way of defining how this performance was a keystone 
moment in Lear’s production history. The sheer fact that Macready stuck to 
Shakespeare’s original plot as much as possible (despite rather judicious textual 
cuts), and that he removed the love-story and restored the Fool, singled out 
this performance. But the production itself—Macready’s interpretation of 
Lear’s character, the illustration of the Fool, and the set design—distinguished 
the 1838 King Lear as a defining moment that changed the course of the 
play’s production history. Through the artistic choices made, the performance 
commented on contemporary artistic theory, while at the same time defined 
and developed a unique critical interpretation of the play. 
Unlike other portrayals of Lear, Macready’s did not begin as a senile 
old man or a weakened monarch, but as a strong vigorous king whose 
“overwhelming passion in his worn-out frame…[hastened] the passage from 
a healthy understanding to a disordered one.”39  In Macready’s interpretation, 
Lear’s passion, insupportable in his old age, causes his madness. Macready, 
writing to a friend, explained his understanding of Lear, and shed light on his 
portrayal of the character: 
“Most actors, Garrick, Kemble and Kean among others, seemed to have 
based their conception of the character on the infirmity usually associated 
with ‘four score and upwards,’ and have represented the feebleness instead 
of the vigour of old age. But Lear’s was in truth a ‘lusty winter:’ his language 
never betrays imbecility of mind or body. He confers his kingdom indeed 
on ‘younger strengths:’ but there is still sufficient invigorating him [sic] to 
allow him to ride, to hunt, to run wildly through the fury of the storm, 
to slay the ruffian who murdered his Cordelia, and to bear about her dead 
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body in his arms… Indeed the towering rage of thought with which his 
mind dilates identifying the heavens themselves with his griefs, [sic] and 
the power of conceiving such vast imaginings, would seem incompatible 
with a tottering, trembling frame, and betoken rather one of ‘mighty bone 
and bold emprise,’ in the outward bearing of a grand old man.”40 
The passion and vigor Macready found in Lear, contrary to other 
representations, not only redefined the character for the 19th Century 
audience, but also suggested a different interpretation of the play. Macready 
conceived of Lear as a powerful monarch, one who commanded respect and 
wielded authority. 
However, as Lady Pollock observed, Macready also created a character whose 
self-conception did not match reality. His body could not support his passion. 
We might conclude that Lear’s giant mistake—disinheriting Cordelia—did 
not stem from senility (even passionate), but from his “outward bearing of 
a grand old man.” In Lear’s vigorousness, Macready had given him a tragic 
flaw—almost as if he borrowed from classical theatre tradition. Perhaps this is 
what he referred to when he wrote in his diary after rehearsals that his version 
of Lear was “very striking [to a] classic eye.”41 
We may better understand Macready’s interpretation of Lear by 
understanding the critical environment in which he worked. In addition 
to the actors who conceived weak Lears, each of the critics had their own 
interpretation of Lear’s character, many of which Macready read during 
his study of the play.42 Hazlitt’s observations on Lear, from Characters of 
Shakespeare’s Plays written in 1817, demonstrated what Macready was most 
likely not aiming for in his interpretation: “It is [Lear’s] rash haste, his violent 
impetuosity, his blindness to everything but the dictates of his passions or 
affections, that produces all his misfortunes, that aggravates his impatience of 
them, that enforces our pity for him.”43  Hazlitt characterized Lear as a child, or 
perhaps more appropriately, as a selfish, senile old man unable to see anything 
but his own wants or needs. Of Hazlitt’s observations Macready wrote, “[w]
hat conceited trash that man has thought to pass upon the public.”44 
On the other hand, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, a Shakespearean critic 
Macready respected, conceived of Lear very differently. Macready attended 
all of Coleridge’s lectures on Shakespeare, so we can assume Macready would 
have been familiar with Coleridge’s opinions on Lear. 45  Coleridge’s analysis 
forgave more than Hazlitt’s, and emphasized Lear’s humanity.  He blamed 
Lear’s misfortunes on “the strange yet by no means unnatural, mixture of 
selfishness, sensibility, and habit of feeling derived from and fostered by the 
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particular rank and usages of the individual.”46  He did not shy away from 
addressing old age, either: “[i]n Lear, old age is itself a character, its natural 
imperfections being increased by lifelong habits of receiving a prompt 
obedience.” 47  Macready’s portrayal of Lear embodied these two descriptions 
fairly closely. Macready mentioned Lear’s “outward bearing of a grand 
old man,” 48 which mimicked Coleridge’s conviction of rank and perhaps 
selfishness as well. Thus, by creating a “vigorous” Lear, Macready situated 
his production among the ranks of Shakespearean critics. His conception of 
Lear became a unique interpretation that participated in the contemporary 
discussion surrounding Lear’s character. 
Macready’s incarnation of Lear was certainly not the only innovation he 
brought to the performance. His most notable contribution to the play was 
the restoration of the Fool, brought back for the first time since Tate. The 
restoration of the Fool was the only element of the play that had not yet 
been seen onstage by 1837. The characterization of the Fool in Macready’s 
performance clearly demonstrated the way in which this production of King 
Lear fit into the contemporary conception of the play. The Fool, although a 
new addition, enabled the play to adhere to tradition while at the same time 
incorporating the new character of Lear that Macready developed.
The neoclassical rules that governed Tate demanded the elimination of 
the Fool in the name of purifying the tragedy. While some of the stringent 
neoclassical ideals such as Unity of Place and Time came to be questioned in 
the late eighteenth century, this particular rule, a part of Unity of Action, was 
still upheld. In the advertisement for his 1768 performance, George Colman 
wrote, “I had once some idea of retaining the Fool, but after the most serious 
consideration I was convinced that such a character in a Tragedy would not 
be endured on the modern stage.”49 Writing in his journal after the first 
rehearsal of King Lear in 1838, Macready expressed similar hesitations with 
regard to the character of the Fool: “[m]y opinion of the introduction of 
the Fool is that, like many such terrible contrasts in poetry and painting, 
in acting representation it will fail of effect; it will either weary and annoy 
or distract the spectators. I have no hope of it and think that at the last we 
shall be obliged to dispense with it.”50 Thus, he illustrated the continuing 
discomfort with the Fool, even in nineteenth century aesthetics. A few days 
later, instead of cutting the Fool, he cut the actor who played the Fool. 
Macready strove to find a balance between what he saw as theatrical integrity 
in the restoration of Shakespeare and character of the Fool whom he did not 
believe could be restored.
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Priscilla Horton as Ariel in The Tempest, 1838.  
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In order to realize his vision of the Fool (and consequentially King Lear as 
a whole) Macready made an unpredictable choice—he cast a woman in the 
part. He had originally cast Drinkwater Meadows, “a capable, routine actor,” 
according to Trewin. 51 On the second day of rehearsal Meadows was out 
and Priscilla Horton was in. His decision to cast Priscilla Horton after so few 
rehearsals shows us Macready’s vision of the Fool and his intentions for Lear. 
He used the Fool as a comparison to Cordelia in order to heighten the pathos 
and family drama. 
When Macready complained about Meadows, he explained his vision 
of what the fool should be: “a sort of fragile, hectic, beautiful-faced, half-
idiot-looking boy.” 52 His friend and fellow actor Bartley suggested that a 
woman should play the role and Macready “caught at the idea and instantly 
exclaimed: ‘Miss P. Horton is the very person.’ [He] was delighted at the 
thought.”53 Macready’s delight tells us that Priscilla Horton brought very 
particular characteristics to her role as the Fool. She was not just any actress: 
renown for her agile dancing and contralto singing voice, she was also very 
young—she turned twenty just two days before rehearsals began. She would 
later be most remembered for playing Ariel in Macready’s Tempest. In the 
drawing of Priscilla as Ariel, we have an image of what Macready’s Fool would 
have been—slender, “fragile,” and certainly, “beautiful-faced.” A reviewer of 
Priscilla’s performance noted, “Her ‘poor fool and knave’ is perhaps not that 
of Shakespeare… Still hers is a most pleasing performance, giving evidence 
of deep feelings; and she trills forth the snatches of song with the mingled 
archness and pathos of their own exquisite simplicity.” 54  Charles Dickens was 
also quite struck by her performance, declaring it, “as exquisite a performance 
as the stage has ever boasted.” 55  
In casting the Fool as a beautiful girl, Macready’s interpretation contrasted 
significantly with later harsh interpretations of the Fool. In the twentieth 
century, Harold Bloom even went so far as to give the Fool partial responsibility 
for Lear’s madness: “on some level of purposiveness, however repressed, the 
Fool does labor to destroy Lear’s sanity.” 56  Instead, Macready’s Fool was 
meant, in the spirit of contemporary criticism, as a contrast to Lear. Charles 
Dickens attested in his review of Macready’s Lear, “[the Fool] is interwoven 
with Lear, he is the link that still associates him with Cordelia’s love, and the 
presence of the regal estate he has surrendered.” 57  Furthermore, the Fool’s 
femininity may have been meant to reference Cordelia and thus heighten the 
pathos of the family tragedy. 
Macready used the visual image of the Fool as a young woman to strengthen 
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the pathos of the play. The actress who played Cordelia, Helen Faucit, was 
just twenty-one at the time of production, and we can see in the illustration 
that she had the same slender, “fragile,” structure and delicate features as 
Priscilla Horton. Thus, in playing Lear as caring for the Fool, as opposed to 
being “[blind] to everything but the dictates of his passions or affections” 58 
as Hazlitt believed, Macready demonstrated that Lear, though passionate, 
retained a consciousness of others’ feelings.
Furthermore, in heightening the resemblance onstage between the Fool 
and Cordelia and in creating an affiliation between the two characters in 
Lear’s mind, Macready escalated the family drama of King Lear. According to 
J.S. Bratton, “the essential Lear [of the nineteenth century] is a tale of ‘filial 
tenderness and parental suffering.’” 59  Bratton blamed this interpretation on 
the “Victorian failure to come to grips with King Lear.” 60  If the heart of the 
piece is Lear’s parental anguish, then the resolution of the play becomes the 
recognition scene, and theatrical intuition says to end the play happily, as 
Tate, Garrick, and many others did. 
Perhaps in other interpretations it may be true that the interest in 
familial tenderness prevents the audience from appreciating the play, 
but in Macready’s Lear, Lear’s ‘parental suffering’ may have increased the 
public’s ability to relate to the story. As we have examined, Macready’s 
conception of Lear’s character was not the weak, unhappy father of previous 
performances. Instead, he embodied the grandeur of a king—he gave orders 
and expected to be obeyed. His role as a father, then, became just one aspect 
of his character, not its entirety. The Fool allowed Macready to stray from 
the familiar conception of Lear as “weakly fond of his daughters,”61  while 
still illustrating Lear’s affection for Cordelia. Through the Fool, the public 
was able to recognize the Lear they understood from the past, and yet, at 
the same time, learn that the pathos they recognized was heightened in a 
stronger, more regal Lear. 
Our final analysis of the 1838 King Lear examines Macready’s choices in 
scenery. Macready’s detailed representations of Shakespeare’s plays proved 
not only memorable, but defined a new style for Shakespeare. It was, in 
fact, something very close to what Kean had attempted almost two decades 
before, except Macready insisted against “‘[having] the magnificence without 
the tragedy and the poet…swallowed up in display’”62  And unlike Kean, 
who was most interested in the possibility of spectacle, Macready’s intention 
was “‘to give Shakespeare all his attributes, to enrich his poetry with scenes 
worthy of its interpretation, to give his tragedies their due magnificence.”’63 
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Macready’s Lear adhered to historical realism in a way the nineteenth century 
had rarely seen before. Judging by the scenic description, Macready staged 
the play as a historical piece in Saxon England, like all previous renditions.64 
However, his attention to detail—lightning that split the sky, sheeted elements, 
the trophies and instruments of war, and elaborate costumes for Lear’s 
soldiers—showed a commitment to faithful representation beyond Garrick’s 
Shakespearean costuming and proportional backdrops. While this effort 
resembled Kean’s determination to have every individual leaf move during the 
storm scene, Macready’s production aimed for realism that progressed into the 
realm of art. Christopher Baugh noted in “Stage Design from Loughterbourg 
to Poel,” “paradoxically, the urge was, on the one hand, for greater reality, yet 
at the same time, it was reality composed and structured as pictorial art.”65 
Macready borrowed from the aesthetics of the picturesque, as well as the 
historical costuming of Saxon England. 
The 1838 performance of Lear was extraordinarily well received. The play 
revived the hopes of the Covent Garden Theatre and Macready’s ambitions 
for Shakespearean restorations, capturing the praise of the critics for the 
entire season.66  But, Macready’s performance had its critics, most of whom 
complained of Macready’s gradual development of Lear’s character and his 
pathos.67  Generally, however, reviews were favorable. The John Bull review 
declared, 
“[King Lear was] commenced with such taste, and so admirably carried 
into effect by the manager of this theatre. Mr. Macready deserves, and will 
obtain, the deep respect and gratitude, not only of the playgoing but of the 
literary world, for his earnest and well-directed zeal to do honour to our 
nation’s chieftest intellectual pride.” 68 
Dickens proudly asserted, “Mr. Macready’s success has banished that disgrace 
[Tate] from the stage for ever.”69  Odell, writing in 1920 and looking back on 
the century agreed, “with this production the ghost of Nahum Tate—so far as 
England, if not America, was concerned—was laid forever.” Macready himself 
noted after opening night, “the impression created by King Lear seemed to be 
wide and strong.” 70   His Lear would be remembered as “one of [his] greatest 
performances and was perhaps of all the most universally admired; its effect 
upon an audience was immense.” 71 Subsequently, he continued to play Lear 
for the rest of his career with great success. 
In 1838, William Macready’s King Lear set the foundation for centuries of 
Lear exploration. His production built upon the innovations and interpretations 
of Tate, Garrick, and Kean, as well as the multitude of Shakespearean critics who 
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first began to ask questions about Shakespeare’s original. Macready’s ability 
to comment on the current opinions circulating about Lear established the 
play as a piece to be respected onstage as well as off. In doing so, he not only 
commented on the contemporary criticism, but also contributed to it. The 
1838 King Lear made decisions about the play that a scholarly written opinion 
simply could not: in the performance, the physicality of Lear illuminated his 
character; the actor (in this case, actress) chosen to play the Fool determined 
the audience’s perception of the role; the authenticity of the scenery and the 
mechanics of the storm scene complemented the text, illuminating the story 
for the audience in a completely unique fashion. Macready envisioned Lear 
as more than a feeble old man, creating instead a vigorous King in “lusty 
winter.” 72 He recognized the importance of restoring the Fool, and how 
the Fool could be used to enrich the performance; he strove to visually “do 
justice” to Shakespeare’s text onstage. In King Lear, Macready finally gave the 
public a glimpse of what the play could look like. We cannot say definitively 
that without Macready we would never have discovered the magnificence 
of Lear onstage, but we certainly would have discovered it differently, and 
probably at a later date. It took a particular type of actor to combine the 
criticism and scholarship of Shakespeare and represent it onstage. Thus, 
perhaps we might say that Macready’s greatest triumph in crafting King Lear 
was simply defying the critical scholars and the conservative theatre managers 
by proving that the play could be performed onstage, and would continue to 
be performed, so long as there were men brave enough to tackle the tragedy.
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On April 17, 1942, a man escaped from his prison at Konigstein by 
lowering himself down the castle wall and jumping on board a train that took 
him to the French border. In November of that year, he donned an elderly 
lady’s garb and pulled off another dramatic escape from France to Algiers.1 
The arrival of this man, French General Henri Giraud, in Algiers marked 
the beginning of a power struggle between General Charles de Gaulle and 
General Giraud for control of the French resistance forces in French North 
Africa. This personal duel and power struggle involved not only the French, 
but also the active and repeated intervention of the British and American 
governments. The United States, under President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 
maintained a narrow-minded stance in favor of General Giraud, a position 
which caused the ouster of their favored general by General de Gaulle in the 
struggle to control the French resistance forces in North Africa.
In early 1943, Roosevelt’s held an idealistic assessment of the political 
situation of France, commenting in a conversation with General Giraud on 
January 17, 19432 that he believed that the sovereignty of France rested with the 
people. FDR further argued that from a legal and constitutional standpoint, 
there could be “no change in the French civil set-up until such time as the 
people of France were able to exercise their inherent rights in this regard.” In 
other words, as Roosevelt retorted when General de Gaulle mentioned the 
sovereignty of French Morocco,3 neither de Gaulle nor Giraud could claim 
to represent the sovereignty of France. Given the German invasion of France 
and the subsequent establishment of the Nazi-backed Vichy regime in France, 
President Roosevelt correctly judged that the French people would not be 
able to exercise their sovereign rights. However, as the war wore on, President 
Roosevelt based the stance of the United States on this narrow judgment, 
which turned out to be too narrow-minded.
First, President Roosevelt erred by comparing French sovereignty to that 
of United States. The Roosevelt Administration tended to view political 
power in France along the lines of its own post-Civil War voting coalition,4 
a situation that led to a distorted American understanding of the sources of 
A Study in American Wartime Politics
Kwang-Yew See
The Downfall of General Giraud:  
Penn History Review     37 
The Downfall of General Giraud
political power in the French political landscape. The British, who stood as 
the strongest ally of the United States during the war, arrived at the conclusion 
during a War Cabinet meeting in June 21, 1943 that US assessments of the 
French political situation could not be trusted because “[the Americans] knew 
nothing about France.5” 
By single-mindedly claiming that the French could not exercise their 
sovereignty before the war had concluded, the United States failed to 
consider the continuity that would exist between the French North African 
administration and postwar France. The US Administration seemed to ignore 
the notion that a candidate who enjoyed a greater popularity at home would 
be most capable of exerting power when France regained her freedom after the 
war. General de Gaulle was that candidate – he enjoyed a substantial support 
base in metropolitan France gained due to his efforts to rally the Fighting 
French instead of collaborating with the Vichy regime. De Gaulle’s base of 
support included every major party, trade union and resistance organization 
in France.6 The activism of de Gaulle’s supporters did not go unnoticed by 
the British, who noted that “the de Gaullist correspondents had been more 
active in the press than those who supported General Giraud,” resulting in a 
perception that newspaper correspondents were disposed to take a view which 
favored the former.7
In contrast to de Gaulle’s wide base of support, General Giraud struggled to 
establish a broad-based coalition. Giraud drew his strongest support from his 
fellow generals and senior officers in the army, but this once-powerful group 
lost influence after French military’s collapse in the face of German invasion. 
The ambiguous stance of General Giraud toward the Vichy government, 
combined with his lack of vision for France’s political future caused Giraud 
to be labeled “a compromise candidate.”8 In a conversation with American 
General Wilbur on January 23, 1943, General de Gaulle pointed out that 
General Giraud could not represent the people of France because he was 
voted into power by Nogues, Boisson and Chatel, all members of the Vichy 
government.9 President Roosevelt did not view the popularity of either 
general as a determining factor behind backing a post-war French leadership, 
as FDR did not believe in the continuity between the French North African 
command and a postwar French government.
Based on the belief that France could not exercise sovereignty before the 
war ended, the United States decided that the liberation of France should be 
a military objective and not a political one.10 Other factors also contributed 
to this view – the United States maintained plans to occupy France after its 
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The captured French General Giraud, during his daily walk. Germany, 
ca. 1940-41.
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liberation, and had already set up a school in Charlottesville for this purpose. 
In any case, the military approach to France’s liberation led to an American 
preference for General Giraud as the leader of the French resistance after the 
assassination of Admiral Darlan, the High Commissioner of France for North 
and West Africa. As a five-star general, Giraud enjoyed the support of the 
entire French military, while the French army in North Africa would not 
submit to de Gaulle’s command because of his two-star rank.11 Second, the 
United States remained wary of the political ambitions held by General de 
Gaulle, who disagreed with the American idea of a strictly military liberation 
campaign. The United States was not the only country that was wary of de 
Gaulle – Churchill had also expressed the view during a War Cabinet meeting 
on March 15, 1943 that de Gaulle had personal motives to have “the title-
deeds of France in his pockets.”12 In contrast to de Gaulle, General Giraud 
represented a consensus candidate for the Americans and British – he agreed 
with President Roosevelt’s view that the most important thing to do was to 
“get on with the war” and would not let the conflicting political situation 
divert him from the urgent task of liberating French territory from enemy 
control.13
During his meeting with General de Gaulle on January 22, 1943, 
President Roosevelt expressed his view that there existed no irreconcilable 
differences between Giraud and de Gaulle. In hindsight, Roosevelt’s belief 
in the potential for reconciliation proved quite incorrect and idealistic 
– de Gaulle and Giraud could not bridge their differences in a number of 
critical areas. The administrative structure of the French resistance forces in 
North Africa was a key area of contention. General de Gaulle insisted that 
General Giraud should rally to the Fighting French, after which he could be 
appointed as a member of the French National Committee and command 
the forces. De Gaulle refused to compromise because he believed doing so 
would be “a disservice to France” because of Giraud’s cooperation with Vichy 
representatives.14 On the other hand, Giraud held a more flexible stance, 
even agreeing to a power-sharing agreement with de Gaulle.15 In the end, 
efforts at reconciliation failed; instead, General de Gaulle worked to assert his 
dominance in the power struggle by leveraging his position on the military 
committee that had jurisdiction over all the fighting forces.
A simple comparison of the background and beliefs of both Giraud and 
de Gaulle would have made clear the impossibility of reconciliation between 
the two generals. General Giraud, who was already sixty years old by the 
time World War II began, was a five-star general in the French Army. He 
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was an authoritarian officer who believed in the military rank hierarchy. For 
example, Giraud informed Harold Macmillan, the British Resident-Minister 
in French North Africa, that he was confident of fruitful negotiations with 
de Gaulle since the latter served as a Colonel under his orders.16 In contrast, 
General de Gaulle positioned himself as an intellectual officer after labeling 
Giraud as a practical one. De Gaulle was never one to conform – as a junior 
officer he advocated the aggressive use of tanks, even though the French high 
command was opposed to the idea. He also criticized General Gamelin’s 
defensive strategy and advocated offensive tactics. After the war, de Gaulle 
placed the blame squarely on the highest ranks of the military for its failure to 
defend France against German invasion, instead of on the pre-war Republican 
government. All these views made de Gaulle unpopular with his superiors 
and peers in the army, a fact that did not appear to bother him in light of his 
rejection of the hierarchical structure of the military.17
The Vichy government was another area of substantial disagreement 
between de Gaulle and Giraud. General de Gaulle maintained a deep-seated 
resentment for the Vichy administration. On June 18, 1940, de Gaulle aired 
his views over the BBC, accusing Marshall Petain of inadequately preparing 
France for war and for seeking an armistice with the Germans. While in 
exile in Britain, General de Gaulle spent his energies organizing the French 
Resistance to liberate France from Vichy control. In the aforementioned 
conversation with General Wilbur, de Gaulle declared that the Fighting 
French represented the true France and held the responsibility of liberating 
the nation from Petain, who had become a “pale shadow” of the national hero 
he had been in World War I.18 General de Gaulle’s strong views in opposition 
to the Vichy gained him the support of French political leaders ranging from 
the communists and socialists on the left to members of the Action Française 
on the right. 
On the other hand, the British Secretary of Foreign Affairs Eden 
characterized Giraud as trying to balance between the Fighting French and 
the Vichy government, resulting in Giraud having “no position at all” with 
regard to the legitimacy of the Vichy government.19  Giraud recognized no 
need to challenge the legal order imposed by the Vichy government, even 
though it had incarcerated thousands of Jews in concentration camps with 
the passage of its anti-Semitic laws.20 A benefit of this ambiguous position 
was that Giraud could appeal to the officers under Petain who retained power 
within the French Imperial Council as well as to the members of the political 
elite in French North Africa who wanted a break from the Petainist past 
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without accepting a Gaullist future. When tasked with dismantling the Vichy 
legal system in North Africa, Giraud proceeded with such a lack of urgency 
as to incur the irritation of the British.21 General Giraud was outspoken in 
his opposition to the Axis powers, despite his ambiguous stance on the Vichy 
government. As a side note, the United States, like Giraud, showed tolerance 
towards the Vichy government – a stance which paralleled the American 
dislike of de Gaulle’s French National Committee. Cordell Hull, the Secretary 
of State, claimed that relations with the Vichy government yielded important 
benefits, such as the opportunity to avoid prolonged military resistance to the 
landings during Operation Torch.22
For the United States, one idealistic belief led to another. President 
Roosevelt, in correspondence with Secretary of State Hull, outlined his plans 
for the French North Africa administration. Roosevelt quickly realized that 
General Giraud had no administrative ability, but at the same time, the 
French Army based in North Africa would not follow General de Gaulle’s 
orders. Speaking to General Giraud, President Roosevelt revealed plans to 
have him and General de Gaulle jointly handle the military situation in Africa 
by forming a three member “Committee for the Liberation of France” with 
a third leading civilian member.23 This plan seemed to represent an effective 
compromise agreement for leadership of postwar France, save for the fact 
that no suitable civilian could be found with a stature comparable to that of 
Giraud or de Gaulle.
President Roosevelt initially suggested Jean Monnet, but only because 
he had “kept his skirts clear of all political entanglements during the past 
two years”24 and would not oppose the American view that the liberation of 
France should above be a military objective. Cordell Hull exposed the bias in 
Roosevelt’s thinking in a respectful way, by reminding President Roosevelt 
that General Giraud’s membership on the British Purchasing Commission 
would “create doubts in a great many French minds.”25 Hull instead advocated 
Roger Cambon as for membership in the future French leadership tripartite, 
as someone with outstanding integrity and loyalty to all the “best elements” 
of France.
Roger Cambon appeared to be all things to all people. To the Americans, 
his father’s service in North Africa cemented his reputation in the region, 
while his impartial approach to French groups made him an ideal candidate 
for Roosevelt’s plans for the French North Africa administration. The British, 
during a War Cabinet meeting, further investigated Cambon’s political 
views and his leadership potential.26 Mr. Cambon had informed British 
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representatives that the rising Gaullism in the region had led to a credibility 
crisis for Giraud in Algiers. Despite holding this view, Cambon added 
that he had a bitter personal prejudice against de Gaulle and would say 
almost anything to discredit him. Indeed, Mr. Cambon’s personal enmity 
for de Gaulle may have persuaded the United States to push for Cambon’s 
membership on the proposed “Committee for the Liberation of France” as a 
tie-breaking counterbalance to de Gaulle’s influence. 
As it turned out, sources close to Cambon informed Cordell Hull that 
Cambon had been retired for some years and would be unwilling to accept 
the responsibilities that President Roosevelt had in mind for him. Hence, 
the United States placed their hopes on Leger, who had a greater experience 
in administration and had proved himself a supporter of Roosevelt’s policies 
in France and North Africa. Secretary Hull proposed a plan to hand the 
eager Leger the role as chief civil administrator, with Cambon installed as the 
Cambon’s advisor.27 Leger and Cambon were known to have a close personal 
relationship, and the Roosevelt Administration viewed such a union as the 
perfect plan for succession of the French North Africa administration.
In contrast to the United States, the British adopted a far more balanced 
stance in the power struggle between Giraud and de Gaulle. The British, 
unlike the Americans, understood the continued influence of the French 
resistance in wartime France. Britain, given its geographical location and 
desire to maintain a close postwar relationship with France, feared being 
on the wrong side of a French postwar power struggle. This worry led 
the British to maintain a balanced stance throughout the power struggle 
between Giraud and de Gaulle. In a meeting between Churchill and the 
War Cabinet on April 11, 1944, the British spelled out their policy towards 
the question of Giraud or de Gaulle: they would attempt in all their power 
to maintain friendly relations between the two generals.28 The British held 
this stance until the end of war, even after General de Gaulle had established 
complete dominance over the French resistance forces, abolished the role 
of Commander-in-Chief held by General Giraud, and offered Giraud the 
insignificant post of Inspector-General. The British plan had always been 
to strengthen the power of the French Committee of National Liberation 
(FCNL) as a check to the de Gaulle’s power.29
Before de Gaulle established complete dominance over the French 
military, the British had refused to support the narrow anti-de Gaulle stance 
adopted by the United States. Churchill and his government understood 
that de Gaulle enjoyed a strong reputation throughout France as the spirit 
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of the Resistance.30 The British recognized that none of the other French 
leaders had “a prestige and position comparable with that held by General de 
Gaulle,”31 even though he had an attitude that made him difficult to work 
with. Hence, the British refused to pin all their hopes on Giraud despite the 
clear preference of their American allies for him. 
There were many instances when events tested the balanced stance of the 
British. In the prelude to the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, General 
de Gaulle recognized the importance of meeting General Giraud to develop 
a common platform for French Resistance, but was reluctant to do so under 
the auspices of an Allied forum. The British stepped in to show de Gaulle 
that they were committed to bridging the differences between de Gaulle and 
Roosevelt, taking pains to ensure that they would not be seen as dictating 
who should be the leader of the Fighting French movement.32 This approach 
appealed more to the senses of de Gaulle than the high-handed insistence of 
the United States that de Gaulle be present at the conference or pushed out 
of the running for leadership of the French North Africa administration. The 
British communicated the same message, but with their balanced stance they 
succeeded in encouraging de Gaulle to attend the Casablanca Conference. 
In another incident, General Eisenhower, for the purpose of coordinating 
military operations with the French Army based in North Africa, met with 
both generals on 19th June 1943 and insisted that the control of the French 
forces remain in the hands of Giraud. Although Eisenhower tried to deliver 
this message gently, his point angered General de Gaulle, who viewed 
Eisenhower’s demand as a breach of French sovereignty. Consistent with their 
balanced stance, the British chose to delay further discussions on this issue 
until the FCNL had reacted to Eisenhower’s statement.33
Who did the British prefer? This question can only be answered by 
peeling away the layers built up by their balanced stance and looking at the 
heart of their French policy. In a meeting on April 11, 1944, the British War 
Cabinet investigated the fundamentals of their policy on Giraud versus de 
Gaulle, concluding that they opposed General de Gaulle in full command of 
the French military. The British preferred to place General Giraud in charge 
of military affairs, believing that he had showed himself to be adaptable to 
persuasion, logic, and influence. Thus, the British decided that they would 
allow General de Gaulle to remain the joint President (with General Giraud) 
of the FCNL, so long as he did not gain lone command of the army.
Given that the British shared a dislike of General de Gaulle with the 
American administration, the reasons the British did not part with de Gaulle 
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present an interesting example of wartime pragmatism. The British War 
Cabinet meeting held on May 23, 1943 involved an extensive discussion 
of British policy vis-à-vis General de Gaulle.34 First, British sources at the 
time indicated  the existence of 80,000 Fighting French troops positioned in 
different parts of the world, a fact which complicated a break with de Gaulle 
because of the importance of these forces to British operations in French 
Equatorial Africa. Second, French Trade Unionists feared the increasing 
influence of the United States. The British, as an outgrowth of their fear of 
supporting the losing side in the wartime struggle to control the postwar 
French government, lent their support to the Fighting French because of 
the loyalty the resistance group commanded among the French trade unions 
and working class. In addition, the British believed that if they sided with 
Roosevelt and broke with de Gaulle, many Frenchmen opposed to de Gaulle 
would rally behind him as a show of national pride. This situation could 
have reinforced de Gaulle as the symbol of the Republic, backfiring on the 
potential plans of the British to isolate him. Moreover, if the British broke 
with General de Gaulle, their actions would be interpreted in the court of 
public opinion as a capitulation to the United States and a signal of British 
diplomatic weakness. The fact that de Gaulle sat in exile in London proved 
an additional complication to the British government’s ability to break 
with the Fighting French, as such a move would likely have harmed British 
credibility with other wartime allies. Although the United States did not 
allow the British to sway its stance on Giraud versus de Gaulle,35 the British 
did on many occasions weigh the American stance before setting its policy 
vis-à-vis the French Resistance. While the British were balanced in their 
support of de Gaulle and Giraud, the Americans were quite narrow-minded 
in their insistence on Giraud as their preferred leader of the FCNL. Little did 
the Americans expect that in the final power struggle, their narrow-minded 
support for Giraud would backfire against their preferred candidate and 
cause him to lose ground against de Gaulle.
General Giraud despite, or perhaps because of his military experience, 
was a malleable character whose beliefs could be easily influenced. Roosevelt 
and the British appreciated the pliability of Giraud; they realized that despite 
General Giraud’s status as a political neophyte, he “showed himself to be 
adaptable to persuasion, logic and influence.”36 Stemming from this belief in 
Giraud’s flexibility, the British trusted that it would be easy to alter Giraud’s 
ambiguous attitude toward the Vichy government, a stance which de Gaulle 
exploited in order to win the support of the French people against Giraud. 
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General Charles de Gaulle shaking the hand of General Henri Giraud 
in front of Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill at the Casablanca 
Conference (January 14, 1943)
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Roosevelt utilized General Giraud’s malleability in order to convince 
him of American plans for the French North Africa administration. FDR 
extended Giraud an invitation to the President’s villa for a discussion on 
January 17, 1943 of the American vision of postwar France. Although Giraud 
“habitually shied away” when a foreigner discussed the internal politics of 
France,37 Roosevelt’s stature as the President of the United States dissipated 
Giraud’s ego and convinced him to adopt Roosevelt’s judgment that the 
French people had to wait until the end of the war to exercise their sovereign 
rights.38 Convinced by Roosevelt’s view that the liberation of France should 
be a military objective, Giraud stated his belief that the most important 
and urgent goal of the French Resistance was to “get on with the war.”39 
When Giraud shared his plans for French North Africa with Catroux, the 
General emphasized the primary goal of the proposed FCNL: to wage war 
and attain victory against the Axis powers. General Giraud maintained that 
complications of war with the Axis made it impossible to have two French 
commanders in charge, and recommended himself for leadership because he 
had lived in France more recently than General de Gaulle and was thus more 
familiar with the situation in the country.40
The malleability of General Giraud’s beliefs made him the ideal candidate 
in Roosevelt’s eyes to lead the French forces in North Africa during the war. 
However, in molding Giraud into an ideal leader, Roosevelt caused him to be 
less capable of competing with de Gaulle for leadership of the French forces. 
Even barring Roosevelt’s influence, Giraud did not possess a strong, coherent 
vision of the postwar political situation in France. The only aspect of the 
Vichy government that Giraud felt strongly enough to condemn was its ties 
with the Axis powers. By convincing Giraud that the liberation of France 
should only be a military objective, Roosevelt painted in General Giraud’s 
an idealized notion of a quick liberation and transition to political stability. 
However, Roosevelt’s influence over Giraud in convincing him of the military 
nature of French liberation caused Giraud not to develop a coherent vision 
for the political future of postwar France, a great weakness for him in the 
power struggle with de Gaulle.
This gaping weakness was exploited by General de Gaulle in his political 
maneuvers against General Giraud. By consistently proclaiming his goal 
of overthrowing the Vichy government, de Gaulle rallied support from 
communists and socialists on the left and members of the Action Francaise 
on the right. By building a strong political coalition, de Gaulle wiped out 
the support base of his opponent Giraud, who ended up with “no effective 
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organization of loyal followers within France itself.”41 In other words, 
Roosevelt’s influence over Giraud left the American’s as his most influential 
and loyal supporters. 
Besides molding General Giraud’s views of French liberation in a manner 
that put him at a disadvantage to General de Gaulle, the narrow-minded 
stance of the United States also served to increase de Gaulle’s popularity. The 
British, understood the negative feelings among the French that arose from 
the US support for Giraud. In a meeting between Churchill and the War 
Cabinet on May 23, 1943, six months before Giraud lost his position as co-
President of the FCNL, the French Minister of Labor and National Service 
informed the British that the Trade Unionists had been showing “considerable 
fear of growing United States influence.”42 Although the unionists did not 
fully support General de Gaulle, the Fighting French movement enjoyed 
strong support among the French working class as the strongest resistance 
force. Hence, the negative perceptions that grew out of American support for 
Giraud hurt his reputation in France against the wily de Gaulle.
By June 1943, the British concluded that the American reputation in 
France stood at an all-time low.43 Churchill and his government attributed 
the unpopularity of the United States to their strong belief that the liberation 
of France should be a purely military objective, despite lacking American 
knowledge of domestic French politics. Roosevelt’s open anger at de Gaulle 
for the General’s expansion of the committee which presided over the 
administration of French North Africa only exacerbated tensions. The British 
linked the plummeting reputation of the United States in France to the rise in 
popularity of de Gaulle, and refused to break their relations with the General 
for fear of damaging their own reputation in France.
In July 1943, the British War Cabinet discussed another development in 
the struggle between Giraud and de Gaulle. The United States government 
had been accused of leaking a public statement to the press in their attempt 
to break up the FCNL and remove General de Gaulle from power. The 
public statement revealed confidential information regarding Britain’s stance 
on the struggle between Generals Giraud and de Gaulle. Churchill sent the 
secret document to Washington as a gesture of goodwill for the reference of 
Roosevelt, and was quite perturbed at the release of the document. The British 
government feared the leaked document would harm their relationship with 
the FCNL, especially at a time when the authority of the committee was 
increasing daily. This action by the United States ran the risk, the British 
believed, of further “strengthening de Gaulle’s position at the expense of the 
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Committee,”44 in particular because the United States suffered a declining 
reputation in France.
The traditional historiography of Giraud’s marginalization contends 
that de Gaulle’s vision for a postwar French government, combined with 
his strong anti-Vichy stance, allowed de Gaulle to outmaneuver his Giraud’s 
narrow focus on a military liberation. But the United States in fact holds 
responsibility for shaping Giraud’s narrow focus on the military aspects of 
liberation. Furthermore, the declining wartime reputation of the United 
States in France caused American support for Giraud to become a political 
liability in his power struggle with General de Gaulle. Despite the consistent 
support of the President Roosevelt for General Giraud, the American press 
often challenged the narrow approach of the Roosevelt Administration to 
France’s political future. The July 1943 issue of LIFE magazine features an 
article which discusses the pro-Giraud stance adopted by Roosevelt and the 
United States government on the leadership of the French Resistance in 
North Africa. The editors of the magazine believed that the United States 
was not “acting in its best interests” by supporting Giraud against de Gaulle. 
LIFE’s editorial staff argued that while General Giraud should earn the 
respect of the United States for his escape from German territory, Roosevelt’s 
insistence that the liberation of France should be a military pursuit was naïve 
because of the inevitable political implications of liberation. As a result of 
this insistence, the article argues, Roosevelt and the State Department based 
their policy on France on Roosevelt’s dislike for de Gaulle. Roosevelt it seems 
overlooked one key fact:  millions of Frenchmen and women “never stopped 
resisting the Germans.”45 This fact cemented de Gaulle’s popularity among 
the French people who disliked the Nazi-backed Vichy government. Thus, 
the narrow support of the United States for General Giraud, who had in 
fact never enjoyed a wide following in France or North Africa, caused the 
General’s downfall and the accompanying failure of US policy regarding 
France’s postwar leadership. 
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One night in January, 1935, the curtain closed on the dark stage of the 
Bolshoi Theater as Solomon Mikhoels and his Moscow State Yiddish Theater 
finished a performance for a gala event.  It was a night of optimism and 
triumph for the proponents of the new, revolutionary, Bolshevik-approved, 
Soviet Yiddish culture.  Stalin himself led a standing ovation for Mikhoels.1 
No one in that theater could have guessed that by 1949, Stalin would have 
murdered the actors in the troupe and Hitler would have murdered most of 
the Jews in the audience.  
Both the immense popularity of Mikhoels and his murder by Stalin in 
1948 were emblematic of the extreme historical circumstances that affected 
Soviet Jewry from 1917 onwards.  Modern Soviet Jewish identity, which is 
fundamentally national with few religious or cultural elements, is a product 
of these extraordinary pressures.
In order to understand how a radically modified identity can be salient for 
Soviet Jews, it is important to recognize that Judaism has been transformed 
over time as new categories have been applied to it.  “Religion” and 
“nationality” are themselves modern concepts that did not figure in Jewish 
identity for thousands of years.  Religion itself, of course, is ancient but it 
was not separated from other aspects of life that are considered “secular” or 
“national” until modernity.  “Judaism developed in the ancient Near East 
at a time when no differentiation was made between religion and ethnicity. 
The biblical account of the founding of Judaism is simultaneously an account 
of the genesis of the Jewish people.”3  However, the religious and national 
elements of Jewish identity have been reconfigured over time in response to 
historical circumstances.
Today, Western European and American Jews define themselves primarily 
in terms of religion, de-emphasizing the national elements of Judaism that 
originated in biblical times.  This development is closely linked to the strong 
assimilatory forces that have affected Jews in these communities.  Jews 
who have culturally assimilated to their country of residence do not wish 
to have their loyalty and patriotism called into question because of their 
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identification with a foreign national group.  This occurred, for instance, 
during the Dreyfus Affair at the end of the nineteenth century in France, 
when Anti-Semitism led to the conviction of a Jewish artillery captain for 
treason.  In order to facilitate full cultural and national assimilation, Western 
European and American Jewish identity adopted its religious focus, leaving 
the realm of the national to the host country. 
In the Soviet Union, the historical circumstances were different than those 
in Western Europe and therefore the resultant Jewish identity was different as 
well.  Like the Western European and American identity, the Soviet concept 
of Jewish nationality is distinctly modern.  Before 1917, assimilation was less 
pervasive amongst the Jews of Eastern Europe, many of whom continued to live 
in isolated communities until the Russian Revolution.  When the Bolsheviks 
came to power, Soviet Jews were pressured to de-emphasize not the national 
elements of their identity, but rather its religious aspects.  After the Russian 
Revolution, Jewish identity underwent a process of drastic transformation. 
It was destroyed and then reinvented in a new national form, and eventually 
the new form was stripped of its cultural content.  Since the USSR was an 
atheist state, religious aspects of Judaism were strongly discouraged and Jews 
were instead recognized as one of many Soviet nationalities.  Religious Jewish 
identity was suppressed in favor of Soviet Yiddish culture, which was then 
destroyed after World War II on Stalin’s orders.  Soviet Jews were left with an 
extremely limited knowledge of Jewish religion or culture, but they continued 
to be identified as Jews by nationality through their official documents and 
they consistently affirmed their own Jewish identity in the national sense, as a 
minority group with a common ancestry.  When immigrants like my mother, 
Elizabeth Vinogradov, left the fallen Soviet Union and came to the U.S. in the 
early 1990s, they continued to view the Jewish people as a nationality or an 
ethnic group.4   Historical circumstances and processes shaped Soviet Jewish 
identity, ultimately resulting in an identity with strong national elements, 
but few cultural or religious ones. 
Soviet nationality policy in general, not only towards the Jews, is an intricate 
subject. Rogers Brubaker has argued that “The Soviet state not only passively 
tolerated but actively institutionalized the existence of multiple nations 
and nationalities as constitutive elements of the state and its citizenry.  It 
codified nationhood and nationality as fundamental social categories sharply 
distinct from statehood and citizenship.”5  In other words, the state and the 
nation were separate entities in the USSR.  Nationalities were encouraged to 
function on a sub-state level; the Soviet Union was not unified by, or created 
Penn History Review     53 
Jewish Identity in the Soviet Union
Solomon Mikhoels playing King Lear in a production 
by the Moscow State Yiddish Theatre, Moscow, 1934. 
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for, any one nationality.  Instead, the USSR was made up of fifteen Union 
Republics that were sovereign according to the constitution, if not entirely 
so in practice.6  Each republic was named after a different nationality within 
the USSR. 
It certainly appears on the surface irrational for the Soviet government to 
have institutionalized sub-state national groups, some even with their own 
territories, as they could potentially have detracted from the central power 
of the state.  While it is impossible to determine the exact reasoning behind 
these policies, there are several plausible explanations that can be considered. 
Brubaker suggests that multi-ethnic nationality policy was unintended by 
Soviet officials, who created it haphazardly and did not expect it to last as 
long as it did.7 
It was thus through an irony of history, through the unintended 
consequences of a variety of ad hoc regime policies, that nationality 
became and remained a basic institutional building block of the avowedly 
internationalist, supranationalist, and anti-nationalist Soviet state.8  
Another important factor is that multi-nationality was a political reality 
for the Bolsheviks, who inherited it from the Russian empire when they 
came to power.  The territory that they found themselves controlling was 
the home of many ethnic minorities, some of whom were calling for cultural 
and political autonomy or even independence after the revolution.  The new 
government was forced to take these nationalistic demands into account.9 
Nationality policy, therefore, may have been a way to pacify discontented 
ethnic minorities, while simultaneously working towards their eventual 
assimilation into communist Soviet society; “the passing of ethnic discontent 
would result in the demystification of ethnic groups and their ultimate fusion 
under communism.’”10  In this view, the government was promoting diversity 
only to eventually attain unity.  I am, however, critical of this interpretation 
because it seems unlikely that nationality policy was only a means to an 
end of fusion.  If this was the case, why did the Soviet state promote ideas 
about national difference so actively and consistently, and why was national 
identification made compulsory through the passport system?
There is another explanation of Soviet nationality policy that is more 
compelling:  institutionalized nationality appealed to the government 
because it was a form of social control.  It was a chance to reshape national 
identities in accordance with Soviet principles.  The government could infuse 
identities with satisfactory content, or drain any unacceptable content. 
Soviet nationality “policies were intended…to harness, contain, channel, 
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and control the potentially disruptive political expression of nationality by 
creating national-territorial administrative structures and by cultivating, co-
opting, and (when they threatened to get out of line) repressing national 
elites.”11  In this way, the power of various national groups could be overseen 
by the state. 
These explanations of Soviet nationality policy in general still do not explain 
why Jews specifically were recognized as a Soviet nationality.  Additionally, 
why did the Soviet state create and encourage national Yiddish culture?  One 
factor was the practical necessity and convenience of bringing Soviet ideas 
to the not-yet-acculturated Yiddish-speaking masses.  The promotion of 
Yiddish culture and the recognition of Jews as a nationality can be seen as a 
“[concession] made in the face of the obvious lack of support for Bolshevism 
among the Jewish masses and the need to work among them in Yiddish if 
they were to be won over.”12  If this was the state’s goal, it was successfully 
achieved.  Many Jews became loyal Soviet citizens in the 1920s and 1930s, 
and formed a large part of the Soviet bureaucracy. 
The new Jewish identity, however, was more than a means for advancing 
Bolshevik propaganda among the Jewish population.  It was also the lesser 
of two evils in the eyes of the Soviet authorities, as  it served as a substitute 
for Hebrew culture.  “The idea was to create a new Jewish culture and a 
Soviet Jewish nationality, one which would be secular, socialist, and Yiddish. 
This nationality would have nothing in common with the religious, Hebraist, 
Zionist, bourgeois Jews in capitalist countries.”13  The government wanted 
Soviet Jews to take on a new identity that would divorce them from the rest of 
world Jewry and align them more closely with the USSR in terms of ideology. 
Yet, at the same time, Soviet officials probably hoped that the new Yiddish-
centered identity would gain international support for the new Soviet state 
from Yiddish speakers, who were all over the world after the great migration 
of Jews from Eastern Europe.14 
The new national identity was also meant to integrate Jews into the Soviet 
system.  It was a way of creating national roots for the cosmopolitan Jew, a 
rootless foreigner.  Therefore, like Zionism, these policies were intended to 
normalize the Jewish people, at least with respect to other Soviet nationalities. 
To this end, the government backed a campaign to turn 400,000 urban Jews 
into farmers since it believed Jews were too concentrated at the top of the 
social pyramid and that some had to be moved to the bottom.15  This project 
eventually became the Jewish Autonomous Region in Birobidzhan, a national 
territory created for the Jews by the Soviet state.  This approach was meant 
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to solve the problem of the abnormal Jews by making them like Ukrainians, 
Georgians, and other territorial Soviet nationalities.  “Like Zionists, who 
needed territory in which to incubate a Hebrew nation in Palestine, Soviet 
Jewish activists fought to establish Jewish agricultural colonies, Jewish city 
councils, and eventually an entire Jewish region.”16  In practice, however, the 
Jewish Autonomous Region turned out to be  essentially a legal fiction.  On 
paper the Jews had a territory, but in reality it was only a formality and so far 
to the east, near the border with China, that few Jews moved there. 
Although the Jewish territory was merely a formality, the new national 
identity was not.  It was an effective means for organizing Jewish society 
that had a lasting impact on the nature of Judaism in the Soviet Union.  By 
condemning certain aspects of Jewish practice and actively promoting others, 
the Soviet government created definitions of “nation” and “religion” for the 
Jews.  The Soviets split Jewish identity into its components and determined 
that certain aspects, such as the Yiddish language, were “national” and therefore 
could play a role in Soviet multiethnic policy, while others were religious and 
had to be eliminated.  What criteria did Soviet officials use to make these 
decisions?  How did they judge whether certain elements of the identity posed 
a threat to the Soviet state?  Actually, they were informed in their decisions by 
the Jewish sections of the Communist Party, who “argued to a puzzled party 
leadership that Hebrew must be a ‘bourgeois’ language because it was used 
almost exclusively by the class enemy, rabbis and Zionists.  Yiddish, on the 
other hand, was the language commonly spoken by the Jewish workers, and 
hence was a ‘proletarian’ language.”17 
Many of these Jewish party members became part of the Soviet Yiddish 
intelligentsia, a small group of writers, activists, publishers, critics, and 
scholars who played the largest role in the redefinition of Jewish identity.18 
The intelligentsia was created and supported by the Soviet government, which 
gave the group of Jewish public figures “conditional access to power to remake 
the ethnic group in the state’s own image.”19  With the blessing of the state, the 
intelligentsia led the way in the 1920s and 1930s, an era of Yiddish cultural 
production in areas such as literature and theater.  The development of secular 
Jewish nationalism through Yiddish culture was seen as a contribution to 
Soviet socialism in this period, not an attempt to undermine it.20  Therefore, 
the intelligentsia did not feel any conflict between their loyalty to the Soviet 
state and their desire to build a Jewish nation. 
The close association of the Yiddish intelligentsia with the Soviet 
government raises questions about which group was truly in control of the 
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transformation of Jewish identity.  Which historical actors took the initiative 
in bringing about the high degree of acculturation that occurred?  Was it 
Soviet officials or the Jews themselves who were eager to rid themselves of the 
religious content of their Judaism?  In other words, the creation of this new 
identity highlights tensions between self-definition and definition by others. 
To an extent, Soviet Jews allowed themselves to be defined externally by a 
dominant group; the destruction and recreation of their identity was initiated 
through government policy rather than a grassroots movement among the 
Jews themselves.  Nevertheless, the members of the Jewish intelligentsia 
were not merely tools of the state.  Although they promoted the spread 
of Bolshevik ideology in Yiddish with the state’s backing, they also had a 
significant amount of agency.  “The Soviet Yiddish intelligentsia served as 
intermediaries, envisioning the future of Jewish culture and society for the 
state and for Jews, and using state power to realize those visions.”21  This was 
not simply a one-sided process based on the state using the intelligentsia to 
destroy and create Jewish identities.  Rather, the intelligentsia also used the 
power of the Soviet state to realize their goals for the modernization of the 
Jewish people.  Both sides used each other, as the Jewish intelligentsia worked 
with the Soviet government towards the same goals.  The new identity was 
not entirely forced on the Jews from the outside but was welcomed by Jewish 
public figures.  
The new national identity was embraced not only by the small group 
that made up the intelligentsia, but also by many Jews in the former Pale 
of Settlement who saw it as a chance to partake in the wider world.  They 
acculturated quickly into Soviet life, leaving the shtetls for the big cities. 
“No other ethnic group was as good at being Soviet, and no other ethnic 
group was as keen on abandoning its language, rituals, and traditional areas 
of settlement.”22  Jews who knew Yiddish preferred that their children learn 
Russian, which they saw as the language of opportunity.  Cultural production 
in Yiddish continued, but once the Jews were redefined as a Soviet nationality 
they felt that more doors were open to those who were willing to acculturate. 
“Linguistic and cultural modernization and assimilation were happening ‘from 
the bottom up’ without any outside interference from Jewish intellectuals or 
the Soviet state.”23  Therefore, Soviet Jewish culture was neither created nor 
destroyed solely by the non-Jewish state.  The Jews themselves participated 
in both the destruction of the old identity through assimilation and the 
construction of the new one.  The process of redefinition was both external 
and internal.  In an essay on Soviet Jewish identity, Aleksander Voronel 
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laments the loss of “tradition, language, unique forms of community life, 
understanding of earlier generations, [and] identity with Jews all over the 
world” that resulted from the destruction of the old identity.  He writes that 
“it would be unfair to blame the Soviet government for these losses.  The 
rupture with age-old traditions of Jewry was to a great extent the fault of the 
older generation of Jews themselves.”24 The dichotomy of self-definition vs. 
definition by others is, however, too simplistic to describe what happened. 
There were some Jewish groups who wanted to redefine themselves and 
reduce the influence of religion, whether because they were faithful believers 
in communism or because they saw this as a way of escaping discrimination 
based on religion.  Yet there were other Jews who were traditionalists and 
played no role in the actions of the intelligentsia.  Jews did not uniformly 
agree on a new definition of themselves, nor did they uniformly accept a 
definition created by outsiders.  This was, at least, the situation in the early 
years of Bolshevik rule, the 1920s and 1930s.  Later on, even the intelligentsia 
lost control of the process of redefinition, which was taken over by non-
Jews in the Communist party and hence became an entirely externally driven 
process. 
By the 1930s, nationality had become a major aspect of an individual’s 
legal status in the USSR.  It was recorded in the majority of documents, 
internal and external, including passports and numerous bureaucratic forms. 
National identification had become a mandatory and pervasive aspect of 
everyday life.  The Jews were locked into their new identity in a way that they 
probably had not expected.  According to my mother, 
“The Jews were tricked by Soviet policies of nationality.  In 
tsarist Russia, nationality did not exist but religion did and 
Jews thought they were oppressed because they practiced 
their religion.  But time showed that that was not the case; 
even in tsarist Russia on the surface they were hated for their 
religion but underneath that there was always hatred because 
of their national identity.  People would say that Jews were 
manipulative, stubborn, and greedy, none of which had 
anything to do with their religion.”  
The belief that the Jews were always a nationality underneath a surface of 
religion is very interesting.  It indicates that after the Jewish national identity 
was established, it seemed to some Soviet Jews almost like it had always existed. 
Some Soviet Jews saw it as somehow deeper than religious identity.  Religion 
was something that the Jews did, but national identity was something that the 
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Jews were.  The route back to the old identity was closed. 
Once the Soviet government had established a high degree of control over 
the Jews as a nationality, there was no longer any need to bother with the 
intelligentsia and meaningful cultural production.  Therefore, after World 
War II, Stalin decided to systematically destroy Soviet Yiddish culture by 
abolishing its institutions and murdering its leaders.  All Yiddish schools were 
closed, while Yiddish publications and theatrical productions were strongly 
discouraged.25  There was the official campaign against rootless cosmopolitans, 
the arrest of Yiddish cultural figures such as writers and actors, and the 
infamous Doctors’ Plot, where most of the accused were Jews.  The murder of 
Mikhoels in 1948 was only the tip of the iceberg.  Most major Jewish figures 
who did not die during World War II and the Holocaust were killed in the 
Great Purges of 1936-9 and the anti-Semitic purges of 1948-52.26  
With the elimination of Jewish institutions, Jews transitioned from being 
members of a community to individual actors within Soviet society.  What 
effect did this have on their identity?  It led to their further immersion in 
Russian culture, the emptying of Jewish content from their identity, and their 
increased focus on their persecution as Jews as a substitute for a religious or 
cultural identity.  What was once a physical, interactive community became 
an invisible, almost imagined community of people who never met as a group 
or shared any religious or cultural experiences but nevertheless felt connected 
in some way.  For instance, my mother felt that her Jewish identity connected 
her to famous Jewish scientists and scholars: “My only solace was the existence 
of these famous and bright Jewish people who showed me that to be a Jew is 
not such a bad thing and that I was not alone.” 
Thus, in the years after the Purges, Jewish identity became externally 
defined and passive.  The USSR officially recognized the Jews as a national 
group whose membership was inherited.  Therefore, Soviet Jews did not 
believe one has to do anything to create or maintain a Jewish identity.  It 
was considered an inescapable fact of life that is recorded in one’s documents 
at birth.  The passive identity is related to the absence of choice that came 
to be perceived by Jews after the destruction of Yiddish culture.  “The state 
kept asking its citizens about their nationality, and they kept answering, over 
and over again—first according to their self-perception or self-interest and 
then according to their blood (whether they liked it or not).”27  For later 
generations, the perception of choice was entirely destroyed.  Jews were forced 
to repeatedly and passively affirm the label they had been given.  When my 
mother wanted to register her son in a nursery or even get a library card, she 
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had to fill out a form and item number five always asked for her nationality. 
Because of the lack of choice, “western Jews have tended to see Soviet Jews 
as tragic subjects or repressed, silenced objects.”28  Shneer suggests that this 
impression is the result of viewing Soviet Jewish history through the lens of 
hindsight, which is colored by the Purges.29   This passive identity was 
all that was left to the Jews after the destruction of Yiddish culture.  Jewish 
identity became a label lacking religious or cultural content.  How could 
Soviet Jews be an “ethnocultural nation”30 if they hardly knew any substantial 
Jewish culture?  My mother told me, “I didn’t know what Chanukah was, 
but I knew I was Jewish.  I always knew I was different.  The only holidays 
I knew were Passover and Yom Kippur.  I didn’t know that Jews should not 
mix meat and milk.  I only knew they could not eat pork.”  How could such 
patchy, incomplete knowledge of Jewish traditions serve as a foundation for a 
national group?  Did Soviet Jews really have anything in common other than 
ancestry? 
There have been some attempts by scholars to prove that there actually 
was a significant amount of content in the seemingly empty identity.  For 
instance, Shneer argues that Soviet Jewish culture could not possibly rid itself 
Jewish content because the cultural symbols, myths, and archetypes that 
were used to create the new ethnic identity already had Jewish meanings that 
could not be erased.31  The Soviet state and the intelligentsia could not have 
created the new culture from nothing; they built it on a basis of Jewish life 
that already existed.  However, this argument pertains mainly to the period 
of cultural production in the 1920s and 1930s.  Jewish myths and archetypes 
were used in the literature and plays of this period, but they were not really 
perpetuated after these formats were destroyed.
Voronel also tries to find some communal elements that can be used to 
justify the existence of Jewish identity as more than an empty label.  He points 
to “characteristic traits and inter-relational principles creating a psychological 
community” and to a “literary heritage.”32  Yet how many Soviet Jews really 
had an in-depth knowledge of Jewish literature?  Their knowledge was limited 
to certain authors, such as Sholem Aleichem, while biblical and rabbinical 
literature was completely ignored. 
That leaves the perception of certain distinguishing national traits, 
which my mother also mentioned.  She said, “Although Jews lost many of 
their traditions, they tried to maintain certain national characteristic.  For 
instance, in the upbringing of their children they always put education first. 
There were more bookish types among the Jews than among the population 
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in general.”  While it is doubtful that such group tendencies are enough to 
maintain a cultural community, what is certain is that Jews nevertheless felt 
very strongly connected to their identity and to each other through a sense 
of common national origin and national destiny.  “They are no longer a 
community of faith as they are one of fate.”33 
In spite of its lack of religious or cultural content, the identity proved 
durable and salient even after the disappearance of Yiddish, the national 
language.  “There was a concerted effort on the part of the intelligentsia to 
make Yiddish the defining feature of Soviet Jewishness.  After all, without 
language what would define Jews in a socialist, atheist, modern world?”34 
Shneer raises this question but does not answer it.  His focus is on the rise 
of Yiddish as a cultural medium rather than on Soviet Jewish identity post-
Yiddish culture, post-World War II, post-Purges.  In the sober light of this 
later period, the one cohesive force that came to the forefront of Soviet 
Jewish identity was anti-Semitism.  At a time when Soviet Jews had very few 
real characteristics to distinguish them from the general population, anti-
Semitism filled that role and preserved their group consciousness. 
Government policy regarding anti-Semitism changed dramatically over 
time.  Initially, in the 1920s, the Communist Party disapproved of anti-
Semitism and even took initiatives to combat it.  Populist anti-Semitism was 
connected to a capitalistic way of thinking.  However, after the Purges and 
WWII, the government’s policies changed.  The reasons for this complete 
reversal are unclear, though it was probably related to the creation of Israel as 
a Jewish state. Soviet officials discovered that “the Jews as a Soviet nationality 
were now an ethnic Diaspora potentially loyal to a hostile foreign state… 
presumed to be beholden to an external homeland and thus irredeemably 
alien.”35  The government no longer saw any reason to protect a group of 
people who were perceived essentially as foreigners. 
Full assimilation became impossible for Jews because of official anti-
Semitic campaigns.36  Thus, the Jews acculturated without assimilating. 
They admired Russian culture, but could never feel that it fully belonged 
to them; it was seen as a culture created by, and for, another ethnic group. 
The most pervasive emotion associated with Jewish identity in the USSR 
was alienation.  This led to a negative definition of identity that was based 
on what Jews were not, namely Russian, rather than what they were.  For 
some Soviet Jews, identity confusion resulted from the conflict between their 
Russian cultural immersion and their Jewish national label.  For instance, 
Soviet Jewish political activist Larisa Bogoraz wrote, “Unfortunately, I do not 
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feel like a Jew…I am accustomed to the color, smell, rustle of the Russian 
landscape, as I am to the Russian language, the rhythm of Russian poetry…
And nevertheless, no, I am not Russian.  I am a stranger today in this land.”37 
Bogoraz later resolved this problem by converting to the Russian Orthodox 
Church. 
Anti-Semitism and inescapable, meticulously documented nationality 
combined to make life difficult for Soviet Jews after WWII.  For instance, 
various “affirmative action” programs were established that legitimized 
discrimination against Jews while favoring other ethnic minorities.  “In some 
contexts, notably admission to higher education and application for certain 
types of employment, legal nationality significantly shaped life chances, 
both negatively (especially for Jews) and positively (for ‘titular’ nationalities 
in the non-Russian republics, who benefited from mainly tacit ‘affirmative 
action’ or preferential treatment policies).”38 
Mandatory ethnic identification made it difficult for Jews to avoid 
discrimination, but is an ethnic Jewish identity inherently anti-Semitic?  Not 
necessarily.  The initial creation of this identity was not perceived that way. 
It divided the community and pitted modernity against tradition rather 
than anti-Semites against Jews.  In the 1920s and 1930s, it was the Jewish 
intelligentsia rather than the Soviet government that conducted anti-Judaism 
campaigns.  Members of the intelligentsia participated in the abolishment 
of traditional Jewish institutions such as synagogues and Jewish schools.39 
Proponents of the new identity were against religion and traditional ways 
of life, but they were not necessarily anti-Semites.  Many of them were Jews 
themselves who wanted to perpetuate Jewish life in a different way. 
However, Jewish ethnic identity later became a convenient form for 
perpetuating anti-Semitic stereotypes, and for destroying the religious and 
cultural content of Judaism.  After the Holocaust, it was associated with 
Hitler and his particularly virulent form of racial anti-Semitism.  Soviet Jews 
“may never have been to a synagogue, seen a menorah, heard Yiddish or 
Hebrew, tasted gefilte fish, or indeed met their grandparents.  But they knew 
that they were Jews in the Soviet sense, which was also—in essence—the 
Nazi sense.  They were Jews by blood.”40  From the Soviet point of view, 
the Holocaust confirmed that the Jews are a race or ethnic group.  After 
all, Hitler exterminated Jews because of their family trees, not because they 
expressed religiosity.  However, the association of Jewish ethnicity with Hitler 
discredits Soviet ethnic identity from the point of view of American Jews. 
They do not want to preserve an identity that was affirmed consistently by 
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anti-Semites.  Why should Jews allow themselves to be defined ethnically 
by outsiders when they can define themselves religiously and culturally? On 
the other hand, when American Jews insist that Jewish immigrants from the 
former USSR abandon their ethnic Jewish identity and re-define themselves 
religiously, are they not asking these immigrants to let themselves be defined 
by others? 
Anti-Semitism and mandatory national identification were enough to 
maintain Jewish identity in the Soviet Union even in the absence of religion, 
tradition, and culture.  Does this mean that Soviet Jews need to be persecuted 
to know who they are?  Can their identity persist in the absence of anti-
Semitism and mandatory documentation?  Soviet Jewish immigrants in 
the U.S. have shown that it can.  Psychological studies of these immigrants 
have determined that when Jewish, Russian, and American identities are 
considered, the immigrants feel most strongly connected to the Jewish 
identity.41  Soviet Jewish immigrants also indicated that it is important to 
them that their children identify as Jewish, even if they do not observe Jewish 
traditions.42  They have pride in their identity, however “empty” it may be, 
and they want their children to perpetuate it.  Self-identification is the most 
important aspect of Soviet Jewish identity in the U.S., which is ironic because 
in the USSR self-identification through choice was impossible. 
Soviet immigrants have also preserved their own form of Jewish identity 
even in a context where they have the chance to redefine themselves.  They 
continue to perceive the Jewish people as an ethnic group and do not consider 
religion essential to Jewish identity.  In the same study cited above, “more than 
93% of the participants mentioned nationality as a criterion [for considering 
themselves Jewish], and only 7% religion.”43  Many of the immigrants who 
identified as Jewish also indicated that they have no religion.44  In general, 
their identity continues to have little religious, cultural, or traditional content, 
though some have become religious or at least enhanced their knowledge of 
Jewish traditions. 
American Jews have had a difficult time accepting the legitimacy of Soviet 
Jewish ethnic identity.  They often consider Soviet Jews, who are immersed 
in Russian culture, to be more Russian than Jewish.  “Soviet Jews are referred 
to as ‘Russians’ by Americans in the United States…However, ironically, 
Soviet Jews were not and could not be considered ‘Russian’ in the former 
Soviet Union.”45  In the USSR, they were constantly reminded that they 
were Jews.  In the US, they are often excluded from the Jewish community. 
These problems stem from the differences between the social construction 
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of Jewish identity in the Soviet Union and America.  In the 1970s, during 
the first wave of Soviet Jewish immigration to the U.S., observant American 
Jews reached out to immigrants in an attempt to bring them back into the 
religious fold but they were largely unsuccessful.  Few synagogues were able 
to attract the immigrants to join.46  This led to feelings of disappointment 
and even resentment among American Jews towards the Soviets.  “You could 
hear it on the streets, on the boardwalk, in the synagogues, in the stores: 
‘Why did we fight to bring them here?  Why did they want to come here? 
They’re not even Jews.  They don’t want to be Jews.”47  Soviet Jews do not 
understand what wanting to be a Jew means because wanting implies that 
they have a choice.  They only understand being a Jew.  Even those who 
wished at some point that they had been born Russian did not believe that 
this wish made them any less Jewish.  Their identity is unquestionable and 
inescapable.  It may be lacking in religious, cultural, and traditional content, 
but it has played such an omnipresent role in their lives that it should not 
be lightly dismissed.  Besides, “passive identity can be transformed into 
active assertiveness, and some form can be filled with content.”48  If these 
immigrants are truly integrated into the Jewish community, it is likely that 
their identity will take on more religious and cultural elements rather than 
remaining solely national; it will eventually adapt itself to take into account 
factors other than Jewish ancestry and a common history of Anti-Semitism. 
There is a perception among American Jews that Soviet Jewish identity has 
been distorted by the USSR.  This is undeniably true.  It was  transformed 
in accordance with the historical experience of Soviet Jews.  This, however, 
does not make it less genuine than American Jewish identity, which has 
also been transformed.  “Judaism has been enfeebled because its historic 
manifestations could not be squared with the dominant ideals of American 
society.”49  A new, modern Jewish identity has been created in the U.S., like 
in the Soviet Union, and in the course of its creation much Jewish culture 
has also been lost.  In a way, American Jewish identity was also determined 
by others; it was shaped by the social pressure of acculturation exerted by the 
great American melting pot. 
Like American and Western European Jewish identity, Soviet Jewish 
national identity is the product of historical processes resulting from 
interactions between Jews and non-Jews in the modern period.  The 
redefinition of Jews as a national group was not entirely forced on them by 
the Soviet government; in many cases Jewish communities and their leaders 
welcomed it and contributed to its formation, especially in the early years of 
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Bolshevik rule that saw the creation of Soviet Yiddish culture.  After World 
War II Yiddish culture declined, but it had been created within a national 
form that persisted while emptied of its religious and cultural Jewish content. 
The label of the Jews as a nationality became a pervasive and constant factor 
in the lives of Soviet Jews in the years after World War II.  They knew very 
little about Jewish religion and culture, but they continued to be identified as 
Jews by nationality through their official documents.  
The view of the Jewish people as a nationality that Soviet Jews 
subscribe to, may conflict with the perceptions of American Jews, many of 
whom emigrated from the same territory earlier and have never experienced 
the USSR.  American Jews have a primarily religious Jewish identity, while 
many of the Soviet immigrants consider themselves Jews without a religion.50 
Confronted with both sets of categories, I struggled to determine whether 
the Jews are primarily a religion or a nation, but in reality they are not one 
or the other.  Jewish identity is constructed and dynamic; it evolves through 
historical processes.  Notions of Soviet Jewish ethnic identity as “not real” or 
“artificial” stem from a narrow approach to the question of identity.  While it 
is true that the ethnic identity was created through historical circumstances, 
especially by Soviet nationality policy, what identity is there that was not 
somehow historically created?  The creation of Soviet Jewish identity does not 
make it an illusion.  To Soviet Jews, it is meaningful and legitimate.
There is no one solid Jewish identity running as an unbroken 
thread from antiquity to eternity.  In this sense, the Jewish insistence on 
unchangeableness is a myth.  It may be difficult to understand how such a 
changeable identity can be meaningful, but each version of Jewish identity 
is meaningful within the context of its own time and place.  Ethnic Jewish 
identity made sense in the context of the USSR, though it is not in accordance 
with American Jewish experience.  The situation of Soviet Jews developed 
differently from that of American Jews, but their identity is equally legitimate. 
It is possible to view the history of Soviet Jewish identity by emphasizing 
the earlier period of cultural production or the later decline and draining of 
content.  The most remarkable aspect of Soviet Jewish identity, however, is 
its persistence.  It has lasted through the transformations of the 1920s and 
1930s, the era after the Purges, and even emigration out of the former USSR. 
The essential aspects of Soviet Jewish identity are its durability, its mutability, 
and its reality.  The rest is commentary.
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Scorning Senatorial Skullduggery in Sallust 
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Roman Banditry:
It is generally accepted that during both the Republican and Imperial eras 
(including the Pax Romana), banditry was commonplace throughout the 
known world.1 Due to its prevalence outside of urban centers, contemporary 
writers regarded brigandage as an unremarkable natural phenomenon only 
warranting a cursory glance.2 For this very reason, in his book Bandits in the 
Roman Empire: Myth and Reality (1999), Grünewald argues that an empirical 
study on banditry is simply impossible.3 However, as MacMullen notes in 
his appendix on ‘Brigandage,’ the Latin term latro (or the Greek: lestes) was 
applied to men apart from the traditional bandit. For example, it included 
individual usurpers or challengers of legitimate Imperial power rather than 
bands of marauders from the ‘barbaric’ border-states.4 Grünewald takes this 
observation further in his work on bandits and emphasizes latrones and lestai 
as historical categories, which can be used to classify social realities. For him, 
the latro is a literary topos, an “artifact of the literary imagination.”5  
‘Banditry,’ as viewed in Rome, was synonymous with the illegitimate 
exercise of personal power. As Shaw points out, in the stateless societies of 
Homeric Greece, banditry was an acceptable and even honorable occupation.6 
However, the formation of ‘the state’ as an “institutionalized form of power” 
left little room for extralegal displays of authority as they acted as decentralizing 
forces that threatened the supremacy of the state.7 With this development, all 
forms of latrocinium or lesteia acquired their contemporary connotations, and 
we come to the discussion of the sanction or the legitimization of power.
The fundamental question we must ask in a discussion of banditry and its 
relation to other expressions of power is ‘who sanctions whom?’  In historical 
accounts and literary depictions, we have three primary manifestations of 
the exercise of violence (vis). We have latrocinium symbolized by the latro, 
rebellion characterized by the rebel, and war (bellum) personified by an enemy 
(hostis) of the state. Although there are certain criteria and qualifications that 
separate these categories, the difference is often arbitrary and comes down 
to the attitude and agenda of the author. With the inherent vagueness of the 
terminology, we see Roman authors use these classifications interchangeably 
according to the direction of their narratives. In short, it is often the ulterior 
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motive of the author that dictates the characterization of ‘historical’ figures.
The subject of the author and his relation to the representation of historical 
figures as ‘bandits’ bring us to a few of the underlying questions motivating 
this paper: Is Jugurtha a bandit?  If not, who is he, and why does Sallust portray 
him in such a way?  Before getting into these questions, it seems imperative 
that we discuss and analyze ‘the bandit,’ as a real life phenomenon and more 
importantly, as a literary and historical metaphor, exploited by moralizing 
writers of Republican and Imperial Rome. It seems essential to note that 
Shaw and Hobsbawm among others are largely responsible for establishing 
the foundation upon which Grünewald successfully elaborates, and it is 
through these three authors, whom I attempt to establish a methodological 
framework from which I can approach the question of Jugurtha. In addition 
to establishing the boundaries among these three primary manifestations of 
power, our treatment of Jugurtha also necessitates a discussion of client-kings 
in relation to Rome. Once we have established the context, we can then turn 
our attention to Jugurtha as he is portrayed in Sallust’s The Jugurthine War.
Before trying to understand what constitutes a bandit, it can be helpful 
to figure out what a bandit is not. In Roman legal terms, “[e]nemies [hostes] 
are those who have declared war on us or on whom we have declared war; 
all the rest are bandits [latrones] or plunderers [praedones].”8 Implicit in the 
definition is that the aggressor or the opposing party must be a “sovereign” 
state acknowledged by Rome.9 Apart from a recognized political entity, 
enemies must be able to fight a regular war (bellum) with Rome. Irregular 
warfare would then be anything inconsistent with conventional Roman 
military strategy and focused primarily on guerrilla tactics. With such a 
selective definition, tribal warfare, village conflict, urban unrest and any 
acts of aggression not preceded by a formal declaration of war cannot be 
distinguished from banditry.10 As a rule, Roman legal classification of enemies 
is very exclusive, and “[t]he terminological indecisiveness of the sources 
raises the question as to whether the juridical distinction between hostes and 
latrones really had any practical relevance.”11    Since both banditry and war 
pose a threat to the state, sometimes the only distinction between the two is 
whether or not they pose a significant threat to Roman authority. Although 
nebulous, this criterion shows how, through an escalation of hostilities, a 
resistance movement can become a war. There are three factors that transform 
an individual and his men from latrones into hostes: the size of his forces, the 
success of his operations and the respect of the opposition.12 Beside the lack 
of a public declaration of hostility, it is impossible to differentiate between 
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brigandage and war.13 Thus, a foreign power could initiate a war against Rome 
and based on size, strategy and success, be considered a bandit-state incapable 
of legitimate warfare. With this in mind, the terms hostes and bellum become 
pretentious classifications meant to distinguish Rome from the rest of the 
world and hardly reflect the historical reality.
The term ‘rebel’ serves as a transition between latrones and hostes and implies 
that the aggressors are inhabitants of the Roman world. The most commonly 
recorded examples of rebels among Roman writers were the Isaurian and 
Cilician ‘bandits’ of the Taurus Mountains as well as the Celtiberians in Spain 
under Viriatus. Rebellions, generally caused by Roman expansion and the 
subsequent subjugation of native populations, often last until the success of 
Romanization.14 It is with rebels especially that we see a significant variance in 
the use of terminology. Part of this inconsistency arises from modern writers, 
who see Isaurian and Cilician banditry as an act of protest against the Roman 
order.15 Similarly, Shaw describes the increase in scale of the Cilician resistance 
as demonstrative of a shift from banditry to rebellion.16    Hopwood also notes 
that ‘bandits’ frequently functioned as the nucleus of any full-scale peasant 
rebellion. 17 Furthermore, he argues that shepherds, whose transhumant style 
of living left them marginalized, were often assumed to be associated with 
bandits and may have played a similar role in regional resistance.18  
This association of shepherds and bandits with resistance movements 
is not an exceptional case. Rebels are often associated with or even called 
bandits, and there is considerable overlap between the attributes of both. As 
we will see, the two types are generally of ‘barbarian’ origin, resort to guerrilla 
warfare, exploit a superior knowledge of the terrain and have complex 
motivations. The nebulous nature of these definitions, which is largely the 
result of authorial motives, can be elaborated upon more easily once we have 
established the criteria and qualifications for our bandit.
In Organised Crime in Late Antiquity, Hopwood argues that bandits are 
not just the literary topoi described by Shaw. Instead, he asserts,
“Bandits were more than an abstract category: their lives on the ground 
were brutal and short; they were men, however, with temporary aims, 
rather than long-term principled causes. In times of stability they were 
something that the political cadre could be drawn together to oppose; 
in times of transformation they were conspicuous symbols of that 
transformation.”19  
Although Hopwood seems to posit this idea against Shaw’s primary aim, 
which is to demonstrate that what we have from ancient sources is merely 
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Jugurtha in chains before Sulla, illustration from La conjuracion 
de Catilina y la Guerra de Jugurta (Madrid, 1772) 
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a figurative representation of an ideal, the two ideas do not seem wholly 
incompatible. Shaw would agree with Hopwood that bandits did exist as 
more than an abstraction; but he would point out that these concrete bandits 
were so unremarkable that they did not warrant the attention of ancient 
sources, and that our sources only refer to bandits in terms of forces opposing 
Rome or in the context of political discord. Shaw even provides an additional 
explanation for why our sources are so lacking by describing his concept of 
‘space.’  Claiming that bandits existed on the periphery of mainstream society, 
he allows for need and greed as the primary motivations for banditry and 
argues that bandit communities “tended to be characterized by an absence of 
all ‘higher’ civil modes of communication in writing or graphic symbols.”20 In 
short, ‘real’ bandits left no written record, so we can only speculate on their 
reality and have to accept our ‘historical’ and literary examples for what they 
are: metaphors. At the very least both Hopwood and Shaw would plausibly 
agree with Grünewald in saying that banditry was perpetrated by bands of 
disreputable folk out to make a buck at the tip of a sword.21  
The term latro originally meant mercenary but came to describe “any sort of 
extra-legal man of violence.”22 Roman legal definition distinguishes banditry 
from common theft by the former’s use of violence (vis), by its reliance 
upon a band (factio) and by its premeditated intention. The first criterion 
is consistent with the notion of an “economy of violence”, which consists 
of materials procured by way of violence or the threat of violence.23 Bandits 
were also distinct from other non-violent criminals. “They were interstitial 
characters, seen neither as persons with rights in civil law nor as enemies of the 
state but somewhere in between.”24 Somewhere between common criminals 
and hostes, bandits were prosecuted harshly and left without the right to 
an appeal. They were either burnt alive, crucified, impaled or thrown into 
the arena. Moreover, brigands were often killed immediately upon arrest.25 
Interestingly enough, these same punishments were reserved for insurgents as 
well, further blurring the lines between the two categories.
By this point, we can tentatively define banditry as a premeditated act of 
opportunistic violence committed by groups of individuals. This classification 
leaves room for both the ‘real’ bandit and his literary representation, on which 
we should now focus our attention. However, before departing from reality, we 
can look at Shaw’s description of latrocinium, which applies to both types of 
banditry and provides an easy transition into the remainder of our discussion: 
“Banditry is a form of personal power… This individual power, based on 
charisma, on appearance, on brute strength, and on the ties forged by way 
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of personhood (kinship, friendship, or clientage), is probably one of the 
primal forms of power known to humans.”26  
This quote evokes images of typical Homeric heroes and is consistent with the 
depiction of banditry in the texts of Roman antiquity. As we will soon see, 
this exercise of personal power inherently poses a challenge to the sovereign 
state by creating a separate autonomous entity.
     Although inconsistent with reality, Hobsbawm’s notion of the ‘social 
bandit’ fits perfectly with the romanticized depictions of ancient authors and 
feed into the framework provided by Grünewald. Hobsbawm takes a Marxist 
interpretation, apparent in his discussion of the social origins of bandits:
“For the crucial fact about the bandit’s social situation is its ambiguity. He 
is an outsider and a rebel, a poor man who refuses to accept the normal 
roles of poverty, and establishes his freedom by means of the only resources 
within reach of the poor, strength, bravery, cunning and determination.”27 
With this explanation, he stresses the bandit’s close connection to the poor. 
For our purposes, Hobsbawm is spot on in terms of the autonomy of the 
brigand, but as we will see later, bandits were drawn from all backgrounds. 
However, his definition remains consistent with a Marxist reading of the 
subject. Additionally, the ‘social bandit’ is motivated by a desire to counteract 
and avenge injustice and to regulate the interaction between the wealthy and 
the destitute so as to prevent the exploitation of the weak.28 He argues that 
bandits are “reformers, not revolutionaries”, but that they can act as the first 
phase in a progression towards revolution when their acts become associated 
with defiance against oppressive forces or when they themselves have been 
overcome by hope for a better future.29 In short, one can see how bandits 
could transition easily between robbery and revolution, as they become armed 
and mobilized.
     To illustrate his points, Hobsbawm outlined nine basic criteria for his 
‘social bandit,’ whom we will find as the prototype for Grünewald’s ‘noble’ 
bandit. “First, the noble robber begins his career of outlawry not by crime, 
but as the victim of injustice.”30 Second, the social bandit is motivated to 
oppose inequality. Third, he is to provide for a redistribution of wealth by 
way of stealing from the wealthy for the betterment of the impoverished. 
Fourth, he never kills without justification. “Fifth, if he survives, he returns 
to his people as an honourable citizen and member of the community.”31 
Sixth, he enjoys the support of his community and often maintains a role as 
a local leader. Seventh, the ‘social bandit’ is invincible except in the case of 
betrayal. Eighth, he cannot be seen or beaten. Ninth, he only challenges the 
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authority of the local tyrant, while the king or emperor is the embodiment of 
justice.32    The mythical account of Robin Hood is the basis for Hobsbawm’s 
‘social bandit’ and is surprisingly consistent with the ‘noble’ bandits we have 
in Roman sources. The main difference, however, lies in the fact that unlike 
Hobsbawm’s ‘social bandit,’ the ‘noble’ bandit is often meant to criticize 
the Emperor and local officials. Otherwise, we will see that Hobsbawm’s 
qualifications act as motifs throughout our sources and that Grünewald 
expands upon the conception of the ‘social bandit.’  Although Hobsbawm’s 
theory is highly romanticized, he does admit the certainty that “[i]n real life 
most Robin Hoods were far from noble.”33  
Using the ‘historical’ accounts available, Grünewald has created two types 
of bandits (‘common’ vs. ‘noble’) and four classifications based on their actions 
(‘bandits,’ ‘rebels,’ ‘rivals’ and ‘avengers’). In his investigation of banditry, he 
considers the cases of Viratus, Tacfarinas, Catiline, Bulla Felix and Maternus 
among others. Although each individual primarily fits into one category or 
another, he admits that there is significant overlap and that his definitions 
,by no means final, should be used only as a valuable tool.34    In this case, 
the ‘common’ bandit is the malevolent manifestation of this classification, 
bent on terror and destruction. In contrast, the ‘noble’ bandit is more akin to 
Hobsbawm’s ‘social bandit.’  As we have already seen, the distinction between 
bandits and rebels is quite arbitrary. Later, it will make more sense when we 
see how and why our ancient authors used one term versus the other. To point 
out this lack of clarity, Grünewald shows through Viriatus and Tacfarinas 
how terms are used interchangeably. The classification of rivals applies to 
political or ideological rivals like Catiline, faction leaders of the Late Republic 
and the Third Century Crisis, and those who are portrayed more directly 
as rivals to Imperial power, like Bulla Felix and Maternus. The avenger is 
probably the most flexible category, as most historical bandits are cited as 
motivated by a desire for vengeance. Revenge is a significant aspect of the 
literary topoi surrounding the bandit, and as motivation, it is consistent with 
Hobsbawm’s conception of the ‘social bandit’.35 Banditry in its ‘noble’ form 
was also typified by its leader’s charismatic “magnetism,”36 which contributes 
to a bandit’s following as well as to the success of his operations. As with the 
‘social bandit,’ the ‘noble’ bandit, otherwise invulnerable, is susceptible only 
to deceit.37 Grünewald cites both Maternus and Bulla Felix as examples of 
men whose exploits end only when close associates betray them. However, 
the ‘noble’ bandit is victorious even in defeat. To demonstrate the fact that he 
cannot be brought down by conventional means, he always gets the last laugh. 
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For example, when the Praetorian Prefect Papinian asks Bulla why he entered 
a life of brigandage, he replies, “Why did you become a prefect?”38    The 
use of quick-witted quips in the face of defeat is an inheritance from Tacitus 
and possibly even earlier sources and demonstrates the inadequacy of current 
leadership, as we will see later in this discussion.39  
The barbarian origin of the bandit is another important feature for our 
developing definition. Rural districts, populated by ‘uncivilized’ rustics living 
on the margins of society, are the typical breeding grounds for barbarian 
bandits in Roman sources. What is considered even more ‘barbaric’ is the 
nomadic mode of life practiced by shepherds, depicted as so unsettled and 
uncivilized that they are not even agrarian.40   As shepherds are viewed as more 
barbaric than agrarians, we see another reason for their close association with 
banditry. Similarly, Shaw refers to the “hereditary” nature of brigandage in 
Cilicia, Isauria and Spain, and we see in Apuleius’ Metamorphoses the criminal 
pedigree boasted of by Haemus the Thracian.41 The hereditary and barbaric 
nature of banditry reinforces the motif of the bandit as a ‘noble savage.’  The 
Celtiberian leader Viriatus personifies this ideal version of the truth, which 
is prevalent throughout historical accounts. The barbarism of these historical 
figures is also stressed because brigandage was considered the most primitive 
manifestation of power in pre-state societies ruled only by social contract. In 
short, the remoteness of any geographical location was indicative of its level 
of barbarism and banditry. 
Although banditry requires a state to dictate which expressions of 
power are and are not legitimate, it also requires a state insofar as it exists 
on the periphery, straddling its political boundaries. Shaw describes this 
area as a “no-man’s-land”, outside the jurisdiction of Imperial governors.42 
Similarly, the extent of Roman control in any district is dependent upon the 
geography of that region. Mountains, forests, swamps and essentially any 
“topography sufficiently forbidding to prevent the effective penetration of 
urban institutions” also usually demarcated the limits of Roman authority.43 
The natural resistance to urban encroachment offered by these isolated and 
oftentimes impregnable locales was thought to be indicative of the prevalence 
of bandits and was believed to be a source of their strength. The bandits in our 
historical accounts are often shown to have an advantage in their familiarity 
with and affinity for the harsh terrain. As we will see later, superior knowledge 
of local topography and the use of lighter long-range weapons conducive to 
guerrilla warfare were commonly associated with bandits.
The band (factio), although generally understood to be small, is an essential 
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aspect of banditry as being distinct from common robbery.44 Bandits rely on 
the social contract they share with their brothers in arms as well as on the local 
support of their families and the greater community.45 Even if they do not 
enjoy the support of the community as a whole, bandits depend heavily upon 
some sort of third party member, who acts as a mainstream contact. These 
receptatores, responsible for the conversion of stolen objects into money, 
act also as informants and are considered just as bad, if not worse than the 
bandits with whom they work.46 The most successful and enduring bandits 
relied on their allegiance to wealthy landowners (honestiores/domini). By this 
association, bandits could legitimize their acts of violence.47 Shaw reports that 
in Apuleius’ Metamorphoses we see the poor as most often drawn to banditry 
for the social mobility it offers (inclusion and a sense of recognition as part of 
a ‘gang,’ acquisition of material wealth and a sense of empowerment through 
the exercise of violence). Arguably the most important aspect of ‘the band’ as 
a metaphor and as a draw for prospective brigands is the bandits’ egalitarian 
system of justice. The most important feature of this ideal is the equal division 
of booty, from which Marxist interpretations arise. Also significant is the idea 
that the bandits maintain a fair system of material distribution without laws 
and, as social contract serves as the only safeguard against administrative 
abuse.48 As we will find, this social cohesion, often absent in Roman society, 
is an escapist ideal for many writers. 
As we discussed before, bandits were marked by their affinity for irregular 
warfare. Regardless, the Romans pretentiously referred to any opponent as 
a bandit if he could not “field a regular army of heavy infantry, trained in 
and equipped with the weapons of Greco-Roman military science.”49 For this 
reason, despite the respect bestowed upon Viriatus as a military commander, 
he was still generally portrayed as a rebel bandit rather than as a legitimate 
enemy. Despite their derision of partisan warfare, the Romans resorted to 
guerrilla tactics on several occasions (for instance, the final phase of the 
Second Punic War). In truth, as a form of indigenous resistance, where 
native insurgents have limited resources and a superior knowledge of the 
terrain, it is simply the most strategically viable option. Along with partisan 
tactics, bandits also used the cloak of darkness “to exploit the common fear, 
deliberately disguising themselves as ghosts in order to add to the terror of 
their sudden nightly incursions.”50 Similarly, there is a common cultural 
association of bandits with ghosts, darkness and death. This connection is 
reasonable as the obscurity of night enhances the aura of apparent invisibility 
as well as the general effectiveness of guerrilla attacks.
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In The City of God, St. Augustine poses two important questions: “Remove 
justice and what are states but gangs of bandits on a large scale? And what 
are bandit gangs but kingdoms in miniature?”51    For our discussion, there is 
only one difference separating states and bands of brigands: the legitimization 
of violence. As Shaw points out, both live “parasitically” by stealing from 
others.52 Like empires, gangs of bandits were known to employ both large-
scale and more modest operations; some bands would even exact payment 
from neighbors in exchange for “protection.”53 Hopwood notes that taxation 
and its enforcement in the provinces by kolletiones were no different from the 
‘tribute’ of bandits. Either violence or the threat of violence was almost always 
used in order to exact revenue from Roman subjects. Additionally, Hopwood, 
attempting to explain why Rome’s policy of extortion was considered taxation 
rather than banditry or opportunistic violence, comes up with the notion 
of a “monopoly of violence” held by the state.54 As discussed previously, 
the development of the state and the formation of institutionalized power 
transformed these expressions from a Homeric ideal into an immoral act. 
Hopwood continues by explaining that if the state is to maintain its ‘monopoly 
of violence,’ then, as a mediator of internal conflict, it must actively choose a 
side, protecting one and condemning the other.55 In doing so, the state creates 
a definition of what is lawful, and because independent expressions of power 
inherently undermine government authority, they become acts of banditry 
unjustifiable under law.
As we have seen before, the most enduring bandits were those who could 
depend upon the influence of wealthy patrons. Hopwood points out two roads 
available to the extra legal man of violence: either he could remain free and run 
the risk of capture, torture and execution, or he could exchange his individual 
autonomy and martial skill for the protection of local elite.56 These armed 
retainers often functioned in two capacities by which their violence became 
legitimate. As their patrons were generally local town-councilors or eirenarchs 
(peace officers), typically drawn from the elite, they could be deputized as a 
pseudo police force, serving as a bodyguard for the wealthy individual and 
his estate. This outsourcing or insourcing, as the case may be, was even taken 
up by provincial governors, who lacked the military resources to patrol their 
own territories. Members of these quasi-peacekeeping forces,known as the 
diogmitai, were generally drawn from those armed retainers already serving 
the local elite. Under Roman law, these diogmitai were quite literally given 
a ‘license to kill’ and were not held responsible for their actions.57 Moreover, 
these so-called peacekeepers often “behaved as badly as the villains they were 
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supposed to be chasing.”58 That Rome resorted to using bandits to fight other 
bandits illustrates the point that the only distinction between brigandage and 
‘moral’ acts of violence was the sanction of the state. 
     In Roman conception, the bandit’s relation to both shepherds and soldiers is 
very important, as it helps demonstrate the legitimacy of power under Roman 
rule. Shaw explains that the shepherd and soldier always existed as “potential” 
brigands.59    The first problematic class of soldier is the veteran. After active 
service, the professional Roman soldier is prepared for neither the transition 
into agrarian life nor reentrance into mainstream society. With their skill set, 
it was much easier to turn to banditry as a means of subsistence. The defeated 
armies of the Late Republic’s civil wars were often forced to demobilize, 
so many of these men resorted to brigandage out of economic necessity.60 
During periods of political instability, robber barons took advantage of this 
pool of unemployed professional soldiers to increase their wealth and power.61 
In this way, men who typically would have been considered bandits were able 
to fill the vacuum and acquire legitimate authority.62 For example, during 
the Third Century Crisis, Maximinus the Thracian, a shepherd bandit who 
became a Roman soldier, won renown and eventually the Imperial throne for 
his daring military feats and positive yet decidedly ‘barbarian’ attributes. Most 
importantly, Maximinus was not the exception; the barbarian bandit emperor 
became a theme of the Late Empire in the West.63  
Similar trends occur in the Roman military in general as it becomes more 
barbarized. Cassius Dio shows that soldiers were often drawn from the same 
pool as bandits and that there was little visible difference between soldiers 
and bandits. Cassius Dio claims that this practice originated in the Roman 
tendency to recruit barbarians in order to maintain an auxiliary force while 
preventing these same men from becoming bandits in their own territories.64 
As we have already seen, many Roman soldiers had lived as shepherds prior 
to enlistment, for they transitioned easily into both soldiery and brigandage 
because they have a skill set comparable to that of solders. Additionally, 
because of the “de facto freedom” inherent in their mobility, armament and 
distance from administrative centers, shepherds were considered natural 
predators.65  
Towards the end of the Republic, Cicero coined the term latro as a political 
epithet.66 Unlike other types of bandit, in its political context, the term latro 
was never positive. However, it still implied that same lack of legitimacy and 
was used more figuratively as a means of comparison between the policies of 
a particular politician and the general outlawry of brigands. Because it was 
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typically used to challenge the legitimacy of an opponent, the term eventually 
came to be synonymous with usurper.67 In coining this usage of latro, Cicero 
drew upon the similarities between political parties and gangs of bandits.68 
As a political epithet, it was used during the civil war between Caesar and 
Pompey as well as throughout the Imperial era. During the Crisis of the Third 
Century, it was used primarily as a way to “stigmatize” political opponents as 
dangerous and illegitimate claimants to the throne.69 According to the literary 
and historical topoi, once on the throne, these bandit emperors maintained 
their personal qualities. They were set apart by their humble origins, rough 
demeanor, brute strength, affinity for alcohol and sexual appetite.70    Despite 
possible positive associations, the use of the term against legitimate emperors 
was generally a result of “the deep conflict between the senatorial aristocracy 
and the so-called soldier-emperors.”71  
The brigand as a political label was also used for local dynasts that had 
fallen in favor at Rome. During the civil wars of the Late Republican era, 
these same warlords were especially prone to being denigrated as latrones if 
they were on the losing side of the war effort.72 Although clients of victorious 
Romans were often safe from this mockery, any marginal, independent prince 
could be regarded as a bandit because it was believed that he “used [his] 
personal arm[y] to fight private wars which, from a legal point of view, were 
no more than plundering expeditions.”73 In short, any semi-independent state 
outside of direct Roman administration was subject to the label of bandit. 
The bandit is a metaphorical figure in Roman history and is used as a 
comparison rather than a representation of reality. As a rule, any mention 
of bandits by a Roman writer signals the existence of an ulterior motive.74 
Generally, literary and historical banditry provides a “social mirror” and 
microcosm of the current social order, which often inverts traditional 
relationships and carries with it a criticism of the inequities of the current 
world order.75 Typically, the egalitarian values of the literary bandit acted as an 
ideal and offered a “picture of a better world”76   where justice prevailed and 
where men could rely on one another through bonds of “philia (friendship) 
and syngeneia (cooperation)” as the only means of social contract.77 
Grünewald’s commentary on the selflessness of Cilician pirates amongst 
themselves summarizes the effect of the bandit as a literary fabrication: “even 
if this report is fantasy, at least it offers an insight into the unfulfilled wishes 
and longings of a society in which social constructs such as the patron-client 
system were no longer able to provide a basic level of cohesion.”78 Moreover, the 
inclusion of bandits in historical accounts provides “a consistent commentary 
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on the nature of power and on the contrast between the opposites of justice 
and legitimacy in the exercise of power.”79  As both a political epithet and a 
narrative device, the bandit is at the forefront of the Roman dialogue on the 
legitimacy of power.
     In order to understand the duality of the good and the bad representations 
of bandits, it is helpful to examine some examples. In the historical accounts 
of Roman authors, Viriatus is a projection of the ideal citizen of Rome.80 He 
acts as a reincarnation of Cincinnatus (or Romulus and Remus among others) 
and the primitive yet noble origins of Rome. Here, his barbarian heritage is 
a positive as it is used to provide a sharp contrast with the greed, corruption 
and brutality of the Roman commanders sent against him. Not only does 
he form a critique of those military men, but he is also a condemnation of 
the decadence of the senatorial aristocracy. Additionally, Viriatus stands apart 
because of his righteous cause. Here, his motivations are meant to contrast with 
the egotistical impulse behind Roman foreign policy. Not only did Viriatus 
resist the unjust incursions of Rome and nobly defend his people, but he also 
avenged the brutal massacre of his comrades at the hands of Servius Sulpicius 
Galba. Roman writers even justify Viriatus’ youthful banditry because it 
served as preparation, “strengthened his manly virtues and increased his 
capacity for great deeds.”81 It is also important to note that whenever Viriatus 
is referred to as a bandit it is only to highlight his superior skills as a shrewd 
and charismatic military leader. He is transformed into a bandit to show how 
barbarian virtus can overcome the Roman military machine.82  
Numidian rebel Tacfarinas, though forced to resort to guerrilla warfare 
like Viriatus, he was depicted negatively. First off, Tacfarinas’ career embodies 
a devolution in character. Whereas Viriatus begins as a shepherd bandit and 
through his manly virtues becomes a tribal leader and successful military 
commander, Tacfarinas is seen as suspect in his motivations and as embarking 
upon a moral decline after his desertion from the auxiliary forces. Grünewald 
argues that Tacfarinas was considered a also bandit because he never 
represented a serious threat to Roman authority in North Africa.83 More 
importantly, Tacitus portrays him as a trivial threat in order to demonstrate 
Tiberius’ incompetence and inadequacy as Emperor.84 Regardless, his negative 
portrayal is also symptomatic of Roman attitudes towards desertion, viewed 
as betrayal and even as rebellion. 
     In the case of Bulla Felix and Maternus, the former represents the 
‘noble’ bandit while the latter his ‘common’ counterpart, distinguished by 
his motivations. On the one hand, Felix is motivated by a pursuit of justice 
84   Brady B. Lonergan
Roman Banditry
and acts as a wake up call for the Emperor; Maternus’ actions, on the other 
hand, are dictated by baser instincts, which inspire his designs on the 
Imperial throne.85 In representing Maternus as a usurper brought down by 
fellow bandits who prefer the authority of the rightful emperor to that of a 
usurper, Herodian questions the legitimacy of the emperors of the Severan 
Dynasty.86 Like Tacfarinas, the character of Bulla Felix was used to cast doubt 
on the competence of Septimius Severus because he had such a difficult time 
subduing a mere bandit. There are also a number of other theories surrounding 
Bulla Felix as a literary fabrication. Grünewald argues that his name and 
character were meant to channel imperial authority. As examples, he cites 
the connection between Bulla and the Imperial amulet of the same name as 
well as the moniker Felix, which was assumed by several emperors, Sulla in 
particular. Additionally, Grünewald points to the link between Bulla’s band of 
followers and the Senate, both of which are composed of exactly six hundred 
men.87 In contrast to Septimius’ burdensome taxes, Bulla is depicted as only 
stealing a part of his victims’ belongings. Most importantly, Bulla is shown 
masquerading in the uniforms of Roman centurions and magistrates. This 
depiction illustrates Cassius Dio’s primary criticism, which is the “loosening 
of the traditional social hierarchy” leading inevitably to the lowest classes’ 
rising to the highest positions.88 In this way, Cassius Dio expresses his outrage 
at the “superficiality and artificiality of state power and social constraints.”89 
In short, Bulla’s character is meant to shift his audience’s focus to the problems 
for which its members should be held accountable.90  
Having completed our overview of banditry, we can now shift our focus to 
the topic of client-kings, which are relevant to our analysis of Jugurtha. Like 
bandits, client-kingdoms existed on the peripheries, both in and outside of 
the Roman Empire.91 Hobsbawm explains this phenomenon perfectly when 
he writes, “Where the state is remote, ineffective and weak, it will indeed be 
tempted to come to terms with any local power-group it cannot defeat.”92 
Although Hobsbawm refers to ‘bandits’ in particular, his statement can be 
directly applied to the case of Roman client-kingship because as Braund argues, 
the relation of the client-king to Rome is not always one of subservience, in 
which case, Rome often acted out of convenience in order to avoid costly 
military confrontations.93 Braund makes this point also because client-kings 
were not always the mindless lackeys abhorred by Tacitus and should be referred 
to as ‘friendly’ kings instead. Realistically, both sides, not just the Empire, 
had to find their relationship gratifying. Linda Honey claims that the whole 
conflict in Isauria arose when the Isaurians, who were originally ‘friends’ of the 
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Roman Empire, felt slighted after Rome had broken their ‘covenant’ (which is 
meant to be reciprocal and has serious implications in Near Eastern culture) 
with the imposition of taxes.94 In return for contributing soldiers, provisions 
and money (rarely as a form of institutionalized taxation), the friendly king 
“had a moral claim to Rome’s protection.”95 Most client-kings had adequate 
resources at their disposal to defend their territory, and the knowledge that 
assailing an allied power could very well provoke Roman retaliation was 
generally sufficient deterrence. This association also served to enhance Rome’s 
status as a military power and discouraged future transgressions.96  
The most important reward for a client-king’s allegiance was the power 
and authority. Braund stresses that men with no legitimate or hereditary 
right to the throne owed their position entirely to the endorsement of 
Rome. These men could also rely upon Roman protection if ousted from 
power.97 Rome enhanced its reputation by displaying its power to give away 
(or simply recognize) entire kingdoms. In return, the friendly king handled 
administrative affairs and performed essential functions in an environment 
less receptive to Roman governors.98 This delegation of administrative affairs 
and inherent autonomy is demonstrative of much of Rome’s policy towards 
local authorities. Braund’s main point seems to be that Rome exploited this 
means of delegation because she “gained a great deal from her friendly kings 
in return for a relatively meager investment.”99
At one point or another in his Jugurthine War, Sallust ascribes the qualities 
characteristic of each of our categories to Jugurtha. First off, since he was 
recognized as King of Numidia, it is important to analyze the nature of 
that kingship. Although “he was born to a concubine”100 and was “inferior 
to [Adherbal and Hiempsal] on his mother’s side,”101 the current Numidian 
king, Micipsa, “adopted him and established him as heir along with his sons 
in his will.”102 Here, because of his ignoble birth, Jugurtha’s legitimacy as heir 
to the Numidian throne is thrown into question. After the death of Micipsa, 
Jugurtha begins to consolidate his power. Instead of sharing administrative 
duties, he decides to dispose of his adoptive brothers “by whatever means.”103 
After the murder of Hiempsal, “[t]he Numidians [were] divided into two 
parties,” one led by the remaining brother and the other by Jugurtha.104 This 
splintering of the state is reminiscent of the civil wars of the Late Republic and 
those of succession of the Empire. It is also important to note that the same 
phenomenon also occurred in other client-kingdoms, where Rome often 
acted according to expediency and did not care which side won as long as it 
remained loyal to Rome. One can then see why the Republican authorities 
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overlooked Jugurtha’s murder of Adherbal and Hiempsal. However, Rome’s 
hand was forced after the massacre at Cirta: “when the choice arose between 
loyalty to a client-king and loyalty to the Italian traders, Jugurtha could not 
hope to win.”105 So, in spite of his connections, Jugurtha overstepped his 
bounds and provoked a formal military response. 
As we have seen in the previous section on client-kingship, Jugurtha shows 
a considerable level of autonomy and does not embody his title’ subservient 
connotation. By sending gifts and exploiting his connection to Scipios, 
“Jugurtha acquired access to the favour and goodwill of the nobility”, and like 
any politically adept client-king, he “canvassed individual members of the 
senate” for his consolidation of power.106 He also interacts with a neighboring 
kingdom through his recruitment of Bocchus of Mauretania as an ally. 
Jugurtha even binds himself to Bocchus through ties of marriage, which hold 
little value as a result of Numidian and Mauretanian polygamy.107
Despite the dubious nature of Jugurtha’s deceitful tactics, Sallust repeatedly 
reminds us of the Numidian’s popularity in Rome and North Africa. As we 
have seen, P. Scipio “counted him amongst his friends…”, which helped 
preserve his high regard in the Senate.108 Most notably however, Sallust 
depicts Jugurtha as popular amongst his fellow Numidians and African 
neighbors. He is referred to as “dear to them all”109 and as “a man so well liked 
by his compatriots” periodically throughout the text in order to demonstrate 
“the Numidians’ burning enthusiasm for Jugurtha.”110    Even Bocchus in his 
double-dealings has to consider the fact that by betraying his neighbor, “he 
might alienate the hearts of his compatriots, for whom Jugurtha was dear and 
the Romans resented.”111 In my mind, the degree of popularity and support 
Jugurtha enjoys amongst his people as ruler of Numidia helps legitimize his 
claim to the throne; more importantly however, it demonstrates one of the 
first and foremost characteristics of our literary bandit.
     Along with fulfilling the criterion of maintaining the support of his 
community, Jugurtha is initially represented as the embodiment of early 
Roman virtues. “He was powerfully strong, of becoming appearance but, 
above all, forceful in intellect.”112    Additionally, he was “[a] man of action 
above all”113 who “had an appetite for glory” and “[b]y working very hard and 
taking great pains, as well as by the most deferential obedience and frequent 
encounters with danger, he had soon reached such a degree of distinction that 
he was overwhelmingly dear to our men…”114 As a Numidian of barbarian 
ancestry, Jugurtha qualifies another criterion for our literary bandit. In 
short, Sallust characterizes Jugurtha as a ‘noble’ barbarian and ideal Roman 
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(i.e. “Numidians for the most part fed on milk and wild-animal flesh”), 
reminiscent of Rome’s founders.115
Along with the previously discussed attributes, Jugurtha is most identifiable 
as a bandit because of his military tactics and charismatic leadership. Before 
every engagement, “by using guarantees, threats and entreaties as was 
appropriate to the temperament of each man, he motivated them all in 
different ways.”116    In short, through encouraging words and his presence in 
battle, Jugurtha “magnified both the courage of his own men and the terror of 
the enemy.”117    Additionally, his tactics stand out as being decidedly guerrilla. 
Jugurtha is often shown attacking “unexpectedly”118   “at dead of night”119 
and seizing “many mortals along with cattle and other plunder.”120    He 
regularly uses his elite ‘band’ of Numidian cavalry to ambush enemy forces, 
and he often takes advantage of his superior knowledge of the terrain and of 
the cover provided by local vegetation to conceal his movements.121    Many 
of the confrontations reported by Sallust are noted for their “irregularity”122 
and are even said “to resemble banditry rather than a battle.”123 In addition to 
nocturnal raids, Jugurtha also resorts to “contaminating the fodder and water 
sources” in his war of attrition against Roman forces under Metellus.124 Finally, 
like our other ‘noble’ bandits, Jugurtha cannot be defeated by conventional 
means. Instead, he is betrayed by his Mauretanian ally and ambushed by the 
Romans en route to an alleged peace conference.125
Although he exhibits many of the qualities characteristic of our literary 
latro, Jugurtha also demonstrates that he is a legitimate threat and enemy of 
the Roman state. First off, Sallust describes the conflict as a “war…which the 
Roman people waged with Jugurtha, king of the Numidians [and which] was 
great and fierce and of only sporadic success.”126 Implicit in this statement is 
the recognition of Jugurtha as a legitimate political entity. It also illustrates 
why the conflict could be seen as both a war and as a series of isolated acts 
of banditry or rebellion because although it was significant to some degree, 
it was of limited success and eventually ended in Jugurtha’s defeat. However, 
there is a significant body of evidence pointing to the interpretation that the 
conflict between Rome and Jugurtha was that between two warring powers. 
Although we have seen that Jugurtha regularly used guerrilla tactics in his 
military operations, he is also depicted as a very able commander and is shown 
only abandoning conventional warfare after his confrontation with Metellus 
(who along with Marius stoops to both deceit and total warfare as well as 
slash and burn techniques against civilian targets).127Against the previous 
commander, Jugurtha mobilizes and commands large armies organized into 
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infantry, cavalry and elephants,128 practices a decidedly Roman brand of siege 
warfare129 and even sends a defeated Roman army under the yoke in the typical 
fashion.130 Most importantly however, the Senate issues a formal declaration 
of war against Jugurtha and dispatches Metellus to direct military operations 
in Africa. And, although Sallust never mentions it, upon his return to Rome, 
Marius was granted a Triumph in which Jugurtha was paraded throughout 
the city in chains prior to his execution.
After looking at the various aspects of the conflict between Jugurtha and 
Rome, it is necessary to look at Sallust’s motivations for his representation 
of the Numidian. As with Bulla Felix and Viriatus, the bandit is rarely the 
actual focus of any historical account. Sallust is no exception in that his 
didactic intentions dominate his interpretation of events and use Jugurtha as 
a means of illustrating a point.131 “Like his Greek predecessors… who shaped 
their narratives to illustrate a view of human nature, Sallust molded his own 
narrative… to expose corruption in Rome and to put the war with Jugurtha 
into a larger historical and moral context.”132 As Dué claims, Sallust’s goal 
was to highlight the moral corruption in Rome. Sallust believed that in the 
decades of relative stability following Hannibal’s defeat, Rome had lost its 
edge, becoming a den of corruption characterized by bribery and deceit.133 
Sallust also distorts the timeline of events to realize his own intent. Although 
the war of succession and Jugurtha’s return from Numantia were more than 
fifteen years apart, Sallust compresses the chronology in order to demonstrate 
the infectiousness of Roman decadence. As a result, the narrative reads as if 
Jugurtha’s moral decline and subsequent ambition for power were precipitated 
by his interaction with the Roman nobility in Scipio’s entourage.134 This 
argument is also concurrent with Sallust’s thesis that the ruination brought 
about by the devolution of virtue into base ambition was caused by contact 
with the inherently depraved Roman senatorial class.135 More specifically, 
he seeks to paint a picture in which members of the aristocracy are entirely 
consumed by corruption while the plebeian party leaders always have the 
best interests of the Roman people at heart.136 It is clear that Sallust has 
a particular political agenda in mind; he often shifts his focus away from 
Jugurtha in favor of the Roman aristocracy.
As we have already noted, Sallust’s historical account of the conflict in 
Numidia is not really about Jugurtha at all. Instead, it is meant to focus on 
Roman leaders like Metellus, Marius and Sulla, who are more important in the 
historical framework of the capital. With these characters as representatives 
of opposing parties, Sallust plays with the notion of political cooperation 
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and expresses his belief that cooperation leads to greatness while the lack 
thereof inevitably results in failure and destruction.137 Additionally, Levene 
describes Sallust’s account as a deliberate ‘fragment,’ intended to allude to 
the unavoidable downfall of Marius and Sulla.138 In this way, Jugurtha and 
Metellus, as well as Metellus and Marius, act as foils for one another and as 
literary prototypes for the eventual ruination of the younger Marius and Sulla 
Felix.
     After looking at numerous sources and comparing our methodological 
frameworks and working definitions to Jugurtha, it seems as if we have made 
little to no progress. In one respect, Jugurtha was most certainly a bandit; he 
relied upon his superior knowledge of local topography, the cover of darkness 
and the mobility of his cavalry to wage a partisan war against oftentimes 
suspect Roman commanders. However, in another respect, as a former 
auxiliary and the ruler of a client-kingdom (loyal to Rome since the time 
of his grandfather), he was obviously a rebel by coming into conflict with 
his patron state. And, in yet another respect, judging by the Senate’s formal 
declaration of war and the Triumph held in the capital upon his defeat, he 
was undoubtedly a hostis, posing a legitimate threat to the hegemony of the 
Roman Republic. Considering his questionable legitimacy and usurpation of 
power, Jugurtha even personifies the Ciceronian interpretation of the latro. 
However, amidst all of this uncertainty, one truth remains: Sallust’s Jugurtha 
does conform to our definition of banditry, but only as a piece of literary 
topoi.
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